Management of post conflict political transition in Nepal:
Challenges and Opportunities
Theme
paper prepared for the presentation at the title … Conference of Management
Association of Nepal (MAN) on 8 February 2013 in Hotel Annapurna, Durbarmarg,
Kathmandu.
Bishnu
Raj Upreti, PhD
Nepal
Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR)
South
Asia Regional Office of National Centre of Competence in Research North-South
Kathmandu
8
February 2012
1. Introduction
1.1
Understanding transition management:
Transition management in the
context of this paper is defined as a governing process that addresses the new
issues and challenges emerged from the boarder political changes in Nepal and
contribute to bring desirable socio-political outcomes (peace, stability and
prosperity). Hence, managing transition requires combination tools and techniques,
perspectives and determination, vision and commitment, flexibility and risk
taking ability of leadership. As transition management is being a process, working
with guiding frameworks and procedures for achieving a desirable outcomes, it
require mobilisation of collective and individual agency of transition managers
(in our case the political decision makers) and other key stakeholders. Transition
management is therefore a gradual, evolutionary (Rotmans et al., 20010 and continuous process of managing socio-political
uncertainties and complications arise from the deliberate, vested interests of
powerful actors as well as societal requirements for the change process. Hence
transition management is a complex and complicated in nature (Bauman, 1991;
Elzen and Wieczorek, 2005; Kemp and Loorback, 2006; Rip, 2006; Smith et al., 2005; Swyngedouw, 2006 and Voss
and Kemp, 2005) and success depends upon the quality of the transition managers
(political leadership) openness, commitment, flexibility, learning attitude (reflecting
and learning from the mistakes and weaknesses), skill and knowledge, resource
(human, physical and financial) management and situation analysis ability. It
is rare to find all these qualities with single leader and therefore it
requires a collective efforts from wider section of society, which is called as
participatory transition management process, where all stakeholders will have
space to contribute in the transition management as per their ability and
willingness (Upreti, 2009). Hence, one of the most important tasks of political
leadership is to crate space (mechanisms, procedures, provisions) for wider
participation of concerned stakeholders that ensure the greater ownership and
political change process become stable (upreti, 2010; Upreti et al., 2010; Upreti, 2009).
I argue that transition
management is not what political and policy decision makers are currently
practicing in Nepal and successful management of transition requires
fundamental and structural departure from the current actions and behaviour to
create enabling, facilitating and cooperating environment at all levels. Unlike
at the time of stable situation, transition managers must steer the process,
not dictate, control and impose, which is often the case. Rebuilding heavily
politicised, divided and fractured Nepali society, de-radicalised and
de-militarised radicalised and militarised youths, reinvigorate the failing
economy, regaining lost hope and trust of people over the political change,
ensuring transitional security and justice, implementing rule of law and
exercising law and order in society, balancing national interests and
international relations, improving governance are fundamental issues in Nepal’s
political transition that require concerted efforts of all sectors of society (private
sector, civil society, academia, media, political forces, farmers,
intellectuals, professional groups etc.) and political and policy decision
makers (transition managers) have the prime responsibility to provide space,
scope and environment for such concerted actions.
1.2
Defining Nepal’s post-conflict transition period:
Nepal is entering into the
post conflict phase after the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by
the then rebel leader Prachanda and the Prime minister in 21 November 2006 on
the behalf of Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the government of Nepal
(representing the Seven Party alliance). Post conflict is a contested terminology because of
its fuzzy boundaries. The main contention is on unclear timing about when it
starts and when it ends. However, from the perspective of peace, it is a time
span between the signing of peace agreement to the completion of implementation
of provisions mentioned in the agreements, which is often completed once the
new constitution (either revised or re-written) starts fully functioning. Hence
it is a situation of transition from conflict to peace (Upreti, 2010).
1.3 Defining Peace:
Peace refers to a state of social,
psychological, physical, and spiritual wellbeing of an individual and society
as whole. However, in Nepal’s context, where society was badly affected from
the decade-long armed conflict and its residual negative effects, peace is a
state when there is restoration of normal relations among people and
institutions directly and/or indirectly affected by the armed conflict. It
includes addressing the root causes of conflict such as social exclusion,
marginalisation, deprivation, malgovernance, social disharmony, and ethnic
tension. It also aims at achieving social, psychological, mental, physical, and
spiritual wellbeing of the people. For that reason, achieving stability and
peace in Nepal requires appropriate process that deals with the past and
envisions better future by generating hope and aspirations among people. In
this regard, ‘transition from war to peace’ refers to strategies and actions to
be undertaken to nstitutionalize the achievements made so far. It is possible
through the implementation of provisions of peace agreement towards achieving
normalcy and stability (Upreti and Ghimire, 2012).
1.4
Objective and scope:
Objective of this paper is t
initiate debate on the different aspects of the transition management with the
special reference to Nepal’s current political process.
This scope of paper is pragmatically
confined to the management approaches and practical aspects rather than
debating on the theoretical aspects of transition management to make it more
relevant to political and policy decision making levels.
- The context: complicated political
transition and unfinished peace process
Nepal has experienced deadly
armed conflict for a decade (13 February 1996 to 21 November 2006), which was
first started on 13 February 1996 by the then Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
[CPN (M)][1]
as a small rebellion in the four western hill districts of Nepal and
quickly expanded all over the country and posed severe threat to human security
in the country (Upreti, 2004; Pyakuryal et
al., 2008). Since 21 November 2006, Nepal has entered into new era when the
Government and the CPN (M) signed the historic peace agreement and provided hope for the
millions of Nepali people (Upreti, 2010), which is now fading off.
The 12-point understanding
between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and then CPN (M) and subsequent people’s
movement of April 2006 provided fundamental basis for ending armed conflict and
restoring peace. Signing of the CPA and invitation to the United Nations
Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)[2],
Agreement on Management of Arms and Armies, the promulgation of the Interim Constitution,
formation of the Interim Legislative Parliament and the Interim Government,
completion of the verification process[3]
of the ex-combatants by a Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee[4];
election of the Constituent Assembly (CA), declaration of Nepal as 'Democratic
Republic' by the 1st meeting of the CA on 28 May 2008 were some of the frequented
reiterated major achievements in the past. However, political parties and the
CA failed to agree on some of the fundamental issues and therefore the 4 times
extended Constituent Assembly expired without giving constitution to the
nation. The peace process became hostage of political vested interests of
parties and leaders, and the nation’s economic development shrunk and society
divided. The selective implementation of rule of law, politicisation and crime
and criminalisation of politics, ethnic, religious and geographical
radicalisation and militarisation of youth, trade unionism and politicisation
of state institutions (recruitment in the senior positions in the
constitutional bodies, commissions, corporations, universities, based on the
party membership and or donation), and governance crisis have pushed the country into a uncertain,
complicated and potentially risky transition.
1.1
Unfinished peace process
In general, peace refers to
the state of social, psychological, physical, and spiritual wellbeing on an
individual. In the context of Nepal, the peace is a state of restoring normalcy
and or improving relations between people and between institutions directly and
or indirectly affected by the 10 years of armed conflict and six years of
mistrust, ethnic divide and radicalisation, addressing the legacy of conflict
and achieving social, psychological, physical, and spiritual wellbeing of
individual Nepalese people (Upreti, 2009). Peace process in the context of the
armed conflict is continuous phenomenon of undertaking the contents,
methodology and outcomes related to end the armed violence, undertake the peace
talks, reach negotiations and address the legacy of the armed conflict bring
the situation in normal or improved stage (Upreti, 2010). Addressing legacies
of conflict is also called as post conflict situation.
Many countries such as Rwanda,
Iraq, and Afghanistan had different approach in bringing the warring parties to
an agreement (Upreti and Ghimire, 2012). They either made a military victory
over the warring party or an outside intervention was used as the most
fundamental power for that purpose. Unlike theirs, peace process in Nepal was
the result of strategic equilibrium (neither party won or lose) as it was
neither initiated out of a clear military victory of a warring party over the
other nor by a direct external military intervention. The CPA, was the result
of strategic equilibrium and therefore the major political forces should have
moral and legal responsibilities in implementing, monitoring, and coordinating
the peace process. However, the initial spirit of cooperation at the time of
signing the CPA has gradually withered mainly because of leadership
failure. Hence, Nepal’s peace process is
now facing severe challenges at different levels in the society. Such
challenges are mainly centred on two aspects: challenges in the structural and
procedural aspects and challenges in the psychological aspect of the
stakeholders. However, these two aspects are much related. Additionally, these
are sometimes the cause or effect of one another (Upreti and Ghimire, 2012).
Peace process in Nepal is
incomplete, fragmented, misinterpreted and blatantly used for the vested
political interests (for example, inaction in establishing Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, groupism of ex-combatants for the interests of
particular political leaders, release of prisoners based on political
affiliation, distribution of financial resources, transitional justice ignored,
etc.). So many major issues of the peace process such as transitional justice,
security sector restructuring, reconciliation, reconstruction and development
are unaddressed.
2.2 Unsettled issues
from the past conflict
The transition period often
becomes an important period to address the mishaps of conflict in a
constructive manner. This is an important phase to initiate the process of
‘dealing with the past’. The term ‘dealing with the past’ refers to how
societies address the legacies of past human rights abuses, mass atrocities,
and other forms of social traumas and the effects of war/conflict in order to
build more democratic, just, and peaceful future. Addressing impunity, giving
justice, reconciliation, reintegration, and rehabilitation are important components
of it.
Reconciliation is a process of
searching for justice, healing, forgiveness, a pattern of cooperation and
coexistence, as well as understanding the needs, fears, and aspirations of past
antagonists. Justice and reconciliation are both fundamental elements for peace
building. However, the languages they have are often found to be incompatible
to each other when in practice (Hartzell 1999). Peace building is ascertained
with these two major aspects. One hand holds the need to deal with those
accused of past human rights abuses and wrongdoers and thus seeks justice for
the victims; while the other hand holds the need for overcoming or transforming
the enmities and building bridges among those victims and their perpetrators. As
Hartzell (1999) observes this issue of amnesty or reconciliation is ‘one of the
most troubling quandaries’ for peace-builders. In the context of Nepal, this is
an unsettled issue. For example, there is a delicate situation, in reconciling
people who were victims of the Maoists and the former Maoist cadres who
committed such atrocities in the village level. Same concern remains with the
state security forces and political decision makers. Reconciliation is possible
only if justice is done to the victims and survivors at the local level (Upreti
and Ghimire, 2012).
Similarly, repatriation of the
people displaced by conflict, their reintegration with community, who forced
them to be displaced are now occupying their houses and properties, will be
very critical. It is important that these issues be tackled conscientiously. It
is equally important to support conflict victims and survivors to claim their
rights to compensation, restitution, and rehabilitation. Similarly, it is necessary
to address the structural causes of conflict within a framework of dealing with
the past. Building positive relations among people who were humiliated during
the conflict is essential and the focus should be on building positive
relations within a community. The state is taking a blanket approach to
compensate every wrong doing with monetary compensation (e.g., paying one
million to many people without any basis). Such monetary compensation cannot
provide justice in all cases. This trend of adopting short term pragmatism would
hamper long term peace and stability.
Secondly and more importantly,
alleged perpetrators and human rights abusers are strong actors in the
post-conflict phase and they are able to influence the decisions. The state has
not been able to curb crime, violence, and intimidation. Human rights abuses,
forceful closures, and damage to property are still an everyday reality in
Nepal. Sad is the fact that the perpetrators are not often brought to justice.
If the wrongdoers are not made accountable for their work, the transition
becomes more complicated and peace and democracy are more than difficult to
achieve. Such conditions boost up a culture of impunity in future, create
hopelessness and helplessness among people and, thus, threaten a sustainable
peace.
The contemporary discussions
in Nepal are centred on legal justice. In addition to legal justice, however,
there is a need for other kinds of transitional justice like rectifying
justice, symbolic justice and social and economic justice. There is so far no
official or public process to address the issues of such justice. However, some
people need a certain period to internalise and undergo a structural change.
Needless to say, they should also be accommodated fairly. Randomly dividing
community into certain groups like, Pahadi, Madhesi, rich (“Samanti”), poor or
showing anger and sentiments upon a certain group is itself a latent conflict.
The transition period should be able to build an environment of fairness,
understanding, and clarity among the radically opposing groups (Upreti and
Ghimire, 2012).
2.3
Dealing with post-conflict
transition:
It requires appropriate
management process that deals with past and envisions better future by
generating hope and aspiration (Tutu, 1999; UNESCO, 2003; Aditya et al., 2006). It can be achieve by collective
ownership of the CPA and its implementation, appropriately dealing with past
and ensuring transitional justice and rule of law, guarantying transitional
security, providing peace dividends to conflict affected people, proper restructuring of security sector and
undertaking reconstruction and rehabilitation (Upreti, 2010). Making this
post-conflict transition successful and achieving stability and peace after a
long period of armed conflict is a very sensitive and demanding task. Several
other emerging smaller conflicts and the lack of consensus on mode of
federalism make this task complicated. This process requires a firm commitment
among the key actors on the good values and beliefs of the past, restoration of
sustainable peace and harmony, a culture of collective responsibility and concerted
action and ability to develop appropriate approaches and procedures. Such
transformation requires changes in the attitudes, behaviours, perspectives,
thinking, and actions of all the key actors. Obviously, as for Nepal, the
political leadership, bureaucracy, judiciary, security forces, and social
elites are such influential figures (Upreti and Ghimire, 2012).
2.4 Failure in
making a new constitution
The CA has failed again and
again1 to accomplish the constitution making task. Many important, yet,
potentially contentious issues, such as defining the state governing systems,
federal structures (boundaries, names, levels, etc.), inclusive mechanisms and
electoral systems, maintaining judicial autonomy are major hurdles to proceed.
The Interim Constitution demands consensus, or at least a two-third majority,
to decide on each article. If the current political mistrust among the major
political parties continues, it will definitely affect the decision-making
process. This has posed serious question on whether it will be able to bring a
publicly-owned constitution even within the extended time. Thus, developing
consensus on constitution-making is becoming a huge challenge.
2.5 Mistrust, suspicion, expectations,
and frustrations
Mistrust of the general people
towards the political leaders and even with the political system is one of the
most worrying issues. It hinders smooth transition, if left unaddressed. With the
change of each form of governing system, this mistrust has been escalating
since the post-Rana period. Trust plays a vital role in politics. Politics
basically operates on trust as people trust their elected representatives to
represent their interests. One of the fundamental criteria used to measure
trustworthiness is to match what one says with what one does. People trust
those who do as they say. Hence, maintaining integrity in this respect is a
must in developing their trust. However, politicians are prone to making hollow
promises and often commit to things they cannot deliver. Such promises are
blown especially around elections and burst to nothing consequently. The most
prominent example is their failure to deliver a new constitution in the stipulated
time. All three major political parties and the regional parties from the
Terai-Madhes had committed in their election manifestos to bring the new
constitution within two years. But they failed to fulfil their promise.
Growing mistrust is also a war
weariness symptom in Nepal. People had many expectations from the newly
established democracy after the Panchayat system. After the political change of
1990, politicians were not able to govern the country as per the aspirations of
the people. As expected by the people, each changing regime was unable to
improve living conditions, restore peace, control corruption, address exclusion
and discrimination. After the then king started direct rule on 1 February 2005,
the political leaders publicly acknowledged their mistakes and promised not to
repeat them in future. In the 12-point understanding reached between the SPA
and the CPN (M), point 7 states: “The seven political parties, undertaking
self-evaluation, have expressed commitment not to repeat the mistakes of the
past which were committed while in parliament and in government”. But, no
change and again mistrust and suspicion in politics and society are mounting.
The situation requires the politicians to start the process of restoring
dignity and rebuild the trust of the people. However, there is another face of
the coin which is also equally critical. There is a growing tendency in people
on demanding and expecting everything to be fulfilled by the state within the
transition period. Such actions have been creating enormous difficulty to manage
the transition.
3
Issues
in managing political transition
In this section neither I am
engaged in theoretical or academic discussion nor presenting the content in the
format of standard peer reviewed journal papers. Instead, I have opted for a
very pragmatic, simple and easy to read style presentation. I did it
deliberately hoping that it will be useful for wide range of readers. In the
following sections I am discussing these issues in the framework of management
of post-conflict transition in Nepal.
Making post conflict
transition successful requires focusing on the ‘right process’, ‘dealing with
contents’, and ‘managing behaviours’, which is discussed in the following
sub-sections.
3.1
Management of process
So
far, process part of Nepal’s post conflict transition management is not only
week but also misleading and therefore it can be said that it is ‘without
processes’. Nepal
Proper process helps to achieve these
transformations and lack of due process creates obstacles and complications
while implementing transformation packages.
Table 1: Indicators of the successful
post-conflict transition management
|
·
Inclusive
constitution making process
·
Major
constitutional issues decided by referendum (ownership principle).
·
Constitutional
principles respected while making constitution,
·
Completion
of constitution making within the defined time
|
|
·
Independent
Peace Commission and all other monitoring mechanisms in full function
·
High
degree of peoples participation in transition process
|
|
·
All
agreements and understandings are implemented honestly and timely
|
|
·
Ensure
transitional justice
·
Impunity
is properly addressed
·
Rule
of law is established
·
Implementation reparation, reconciliation,
rehabilitation, reintegration, reconstruction packages,
|
|
·
Police
performance is effective and free from politicisation and malpractices
·
Security
situation is ensured
·
Illegal
arms supply controlled
·
Armed
groups, if any, controlled
|
|
·
Smooth
implementation of DDR and SSR according standard practices
·
Key
stakeholders committed for SSR
·
New
national security policy formulated
·
Collective
commitment from all political parties in addressing transitional challenges
|
|
·
Human
rights situation is improved
·
Impunity
is full addressed
·
Full
justice to conflict victims and survivors
·
Rule
of law respected
|
|
·
Constructive
dialogue, mutual respect and collective responses among political parties (coalition culture)
·
Decide
the irreconcilable difference through democratic procedure (e.g., voting)
|
|
·
Collective
commitment and ensure all requirement for election to provide elected functional leadership in local and national government
·
Develop
public ownership of transition management by involving people
·
Consensus
in development priority and economic development
|
|
·
Cautious
and well assessed response to popular and extremist demand
·
Engage
in dialogue and interaction (respond but not react)
·
Coalition
culture and proper power sharing arrangement
·
Non-interference
in the function of security forces, bureaucracy, judiciary
·
Positive
indication or the high economic growth rate
·
Major
infrastructure development started
·
Rights
of citizens respected
|
|
·
LPC
independently engage on dealing with the past
·
Reintegration
and psychological reconstruction incorporated into national policy and
practices
|
Source: Compiled from Upreti 2008; Upreti
2006 and 2004.
3.1.1
Managing the content
Successful management of post conflict
transition requires a process of smooth transformation
of the transition (Pyakuryal
et al., 2008f). It is possible only when the political, economic, social,
cultural, psychological barriers are dismantled and new vision and commitments
are made through appropriate process (Bloomfield et al., 2003; Galtung, 1996; Upreti, 2004). It is virtually
impossible to manage complicated transition without transforming perspective,
thinking, action and behaviour of political decision makers of Nepal.
Transformation requires in:
a)
Attitude,
behaviour, perspective, thinking and action of major actors (political
leadership, bureaucracy, judiciary, security forces, social elites and their
organizational structures, procedure and mode of representation);
b)
Rules
of procedures and minimum political ethics,
c)
Issue/contents
(addressing the war-time issues and CPA contents,
d)
Structures
(transformation is required in existing structure and power relations),
e)
Context
(transformation of exclusionary and controlling patterns of governance),
f)
Value (e.g., social change through violent action to
social change through peaceful action, non-violence, and co-existence).
The
post-conflict transition management must
a)
address
root causes of the conflict and structural inequalities;
b)
build
trust, cohesion and harmony at community;
c)
develop
community resilience to cope with the adverse impacts of conflict;
d)
create
space and opportunities for peace building,
e)
ensure
visible benefit to socially excluded and marginalized people and make sure that
they are included in the decision making process;
f)
prevent
possible widening of gap between rich and poor and enforces discriminations;
g)
make
sure that development interventions are not introducing new conflicts and
tensions and
ensure that resources are not captured
and manipulated by elites. This is possible through incorporating PCIA into
development programmes and projects.
3.1.2
Managing the behaviour
Behavioural response in post conflict situation
Nepal’s current
transition is becoming extremely complicate to manage mainly because of the
erratic behaviour of the political decision makers. Post conflict transition
became shaky because of the insensitive behaviour of some of the political and
social leaders who hoped to benefit by manipulating the ethnic sentiments. It
will be extremely difficult to successfully mange transition if the current
approach of political leaders continues. So far, leadership failed to
internalise the complexity of managing post-conflict transformation (Upreti, 2008c). Making transition successful requires accomplishing the following:
- Agreeing on the
constitutional principles for the new constitution
- Implementation of
the agreements and understanding
- Monitoring of the
implementation
- Adaptation and
revisions of the agreements
- Stakeholders participation in
implementing the CPA provisions
- Collective commitment for the new
election for making new constitution
- Agreeing and conducting local election
that provide political space for democracy to function
3.1.3
Federalisation of country
3.1.4
Constructive engagement of the
international community
3.1.5
India, china and geopolitics
3.1.6
Addressing voices of
marginalised, excluded and poor
3.1.7
Restoring law and order
Exercising rule of law is a
major concern. Organized crimes and insecurity are mounting, extortion,
abduction, robbery, looting, narcotics smuggling, rape, girls trafficking,
hunting and smuggling of rare animals (e.g., musk deer, valuable furry skin,
tiger bones, rare herbs, woods, etc.) are still continuing or in some cases
they are even growing. So far political parties have not proactively engaged
enough to deal with transitional security concern. Further, if parties continue
their coercive youth mobilisation it will be the worst situation. Hence,
addressing transitional security and restoring law and order requires change in
the current style of dealing of political parties and need to promote
collective efforts from government, political parties, security actors, civil
society, media and community.
3.1.8
Terai issue
3.2
Management of expectation
3.3
Management of time
3.4
Management of externalities
4 Neutrality and non-interference
One of the existing challenges
in Nepal is politicisation and political interference in the governing system.
The implementation of peace agreements requires neutrality and
non-politicisation. So, based on past experiences, a strong mechanism needs to
be devised. This mechanism should bring bureaucratic, political, judicial, and
security reforms. It plays significant role to maintain neutrality and minimise
political interference in governance and development. Indubitably, it will be
feasible only after the new constitution is in place. Therefore, a transitional
arrangement to ensure neutrality and non-interference, such as a governing
oversight mechanism, is essential until the implementation of a new
constitution (Upreti and Ghimire, 2012).
4.1
Management of extremes
4.2
Some of possible structures
required for successful management of post-conflict transition
The present
centralised state structures (like ministries and departments) are not suitable
to address the challenges of the post-conflict transition (e.g., MoPR) and
therefore either their scope have to be shifted to the new structures or they
have to change the existing mode of operation.
- Independent Land Reform Commission
- National
Security Council or Security Commission for Security Sector Restructuring,
- Commission for the
Investigation of Disappeared Persons
- Local Peace Committee
- National Peace Commission
- State Restructuring (Recommendation)
Commission
- Accountability Commission
- Research
and Resource Centre,
- Post-Conflict
reconstruction Commission
- Technical
Committees
and Special Task Forces (for thematic issues)
4.3
4.4 Bb
4.5 Cc
4.6 dd
5
Opportunities
in managing political transition
6
Challenges
of managing political transition
6.1
Conceptual, ideological
Challenges
6.2
Operational Challenges
- Agreeing on federal
structures
- Coping with unanticipated
challenges emerging in the course of transition.
- Agreeing on creation of
structures as required by the peace agreements,
- Promoting economic growth
and stability
- Ensuring peace dividends
to conflict victims and poor sections of society,
- Ensuring transitional
Justice and rule of law,
- Ensuring transitional
security[5],
- Facilitating disarming,
demobilizing and demilitarisation (society is heavily militarised),
- Conduction of free and
fair elections,
- Implementation of
reconciliation, rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction,
- Implementation of the
understandings and agreements reached in the past,
- Keeping external
interference away or minimum an obtaining international support,
- Maintaining impartiality
and keeping security, bureaucracy and judiciary out of political
interference
- Managing and or
addressing public expectation and frustration,
- Monitoring of peace
process and peace agreements,
- Peace dividends to
conflict affected people and reparation packages.
- Realising the need of
political party building[6]
- Initiating appropriate
reconstruction and development[7]
- Security
system restructuring
The widening gap of mistrust
between the major political parties has caused serious hurdles in managing
transition and moving this country ahead. Political scientists often argue that
there is no enemy in the politics but there is opponent. However, the major
political parties in Nepal are treating their opponents as invisible enemies
(especially in settling the differences). They are blatantly abusing very
sensitive issues like ethnic radicalism for their vested political interests rather
than handling sensitive issues delicately. However, degree and intensity of
abuses vary between parties.
6.2.1
Challenges to Party
Organization and Conduct
6.2.2
Lack of transitional security
Global experiences show that
transitional security is one of the prime concerns in countries that have
experienced civil war and violent armed conflict. Nepal is no exception.
Achieving stability, peace, and democracy requires vision, commitments, and
right institutional arrangements on security in this transitional period. Based
on extensive research on the issues of managing post-conflict transitions and
achieving peace, the authors argue that, first and foremost, important factor
is to respect ‘rule of law’. It ensures respecting human rights, exercising
democratic practices, and effective implementation of development agendas.
However, in Nepal, transitional security is deteriorating day-by-day. The
radicalisation of society and the use of violence (e.g., forceful closures and
bandhs, strikes, damaging public and private properties, and so forth) to fulfil
their demands are becoming regular phenomena. For example, only in a single
month (in August 2007), 19 different groups[8]
had called 55 bandhs and blockades in Nepal. General strikes, closures (which
are sometimes even indefinite) and blockades are routinely observed across the
country. Often, small disputes take a violent turn like blazing vehicles,
smashing or destroying public and private properties, humiliating travellers.
Violent clashes between
the wings of various political
parties are frequent. They further create insecurity and development
challenges. Similarly, most of the major political parties have used youth
forces in coercion in the name of providing security. The Young Communist
League[9]
(YCL), Youth Force (YF), and Madhes Rakshya Bahini (MRB) are very few examples
of the militarised youth organisations. Such coercive mobilisation of the
youths by political parties has also infested the state with insecurity and
violence thereby obstructing development. Mostly, the political actors have
created these petty interested groups. Quite ironically and irritatingly, their
actions have been wrongly justified as necessary to provide security to people in
case the state fails to do so. But at the heart of this militarisation are
vested interests of several groups who are represented in the state. They are
using development as means of resource capture where local parties’ cadres
divide the local financial resources for their personal and/or partisan
benefits. This creates parallel structures and violates rules of law. Here, the
state as an elite actor ought to be empowered as a legislative authority to
deal with the situations. Only the legally defined institution of the state has
the mandate to use coercive force. Other organisations operating parallel
without any legal mandate consequently weaken the state security apparatus and
ultimately create chaos.
The criminalisation of
politics and politicisation of crime is becoming a common character in Nepal.
Criminals are politically protected and used for the political parties'
benefit. Transitional security always suffers from such political protection to
criminals. The mobilisation of criminals for political purpose and at the same
time political interests in protecting them for a specific political party’s
purpose have jeopardised transitional security. Similarly, the practice of
silencing weak victims by threatening makes the system weak. Most often, taking
undue advantages from transitional tension are the interests of powerful groups
in Nepal. Direct or indirect engagement of powerful elites in extra-legal activities
worsens security problems. Further, impunity is a serious problem in transition.
For example, no further action against those held guilty by the Mallik Commission
and Rayamajhi Commission is a glaring example of how Nepal deal with the
impunity.
6.3 Proliferation of
SALW and criminalisation of society
The proliferation of Small
Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) is another challenge. Undoubtedly, the illicit
trade and use of SALW not only intensifies civil wars and armed conflicts, but
also creates insecurity and severely hinders post-peace agreement,
reconciliation, and reconstruction efforts. In Nepal, it is extremely difficult
to find out the actual number and types of SALW illegally produced, traded, and
used in different parts of the country. However, the proliferation of SALW in
Nepal is one of the major security challenges (Upreti and Nepali 2006). In
Nepal, the proliferation of SALW owes not just to the 10 years of armed conflict
and consequent implications, but also to rampant poverty, chronic unemployment
and the open border with India. So, the state should urgently respond to the
small arms flow seriously. The government needs to play a lead role to combat
the illegal proliferation of small arms. This campaign succeeds only if the
political parties, civil society, experts, the international community, and
citizens as a whole support it actively. Organised crime and insecurity related
to extortion, abduction, robbery, looting, narcotics smuggling, human
trafficking, bootlegging, and the hunting and smuggling of rare animals (e.g.,
musk deer, tiger bones, etc.) are increasing. Furthermore, coercive youth
mobilisation is complicating the security challenges. Addressing these
phenomena is the collective responsibility of the government, political
parties, security actors, civil society, academicians, the media, and the
community.
6.4. External interference in the framing of the constitution and management
of transition
The influences of powerful
countries are stronger in the countries suffering from conflict, instability,
and in those who are dependent on external support and resources. Like
Afghanistan, South Sudan and many other conflict affected countries, Nepal is
another example of how external interests are prevailing in political, social,
and economic spheres. It is working in the prickly cushion offered in the name
of support to various activities like federalisation, constitution-making,
peace process, integration, and rehabilitation of excombatants, human rights,
social justices, minority rights, security sector reform, economic reform,
bureaucratic reform and legal reform. Moreover, it is also receiving donations
in the name of institutional development, economic reform and development
policy formulation. The support is penetrating into core national interests
such as national security policy, strengthening security institutions etc. No
political decision-makers and bureaucratic mechanisms have demonstrated their
commitment to address these serious issues of these external interferences.
Several constitutions have
been written and submitted to the then CA and the politicians by different
interest-based organisations from the donor-funded money. Large portion of time
of the Constituent Assembly (CA) members were consumed by the foreign tours an trainings,
attending meetings and workshops in Nepal and aboard, writing papers, and
inaugurating events of the NGOs funded by donors. Most of the (if not all) activities
were stealing precious time of the CA members to to constructively engage in
settling core contentious issues before finalising the constitution. Even it
has been observed that the CA members had attended the numerous but repetitive
workshops and meetings organised by NGOs and funded by donors leaving the
important meetings of the CA. It is very hard to comprehend how
constitution-making is supported by such activities of CA members and NGOs.
Such activities were nearly paralysing the transition and constitution-making
process in Nepal.
6.5 Institutionalisation of changes through new constitution
Nepal has to institutionalise
the changes achieved from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by promulgating the
new constitution. However, the constitution making is not much in priority in
the activities of political leaders. For example, most of the political leaders
are found not respecting CA meetings.
- Critique of management of
transition
Elizabeth Shove and Gordon Walker from
Department of Sociology and Department of Geography, Lancaster University are
critical in the management of transition. They write:, “We are wary of the
notion that transition management, with its accompanying repertoire of concepts
and tools, provides a neat model of how managers might intervene (albeit
reflexively) to shape and modulate processes of change. We have observed that
these approaches can all too easily obscure their own politics, smoothing over
conflict and inequality; working with tacit assumptions of consensus and
expecting far more than participatory processes can ever hope to deliver” (Page
7).
- Conclusion
Making Nepal’s post-conflict
transition successful requires change in current mindset of political decision
makes and collective efforts of political parties, civil society, bureaucracy,
security organizations and international community. It is crucially important
to review the past achievements and problems faced in the past 6 years (since
signing of the CPA) in terms of on process, mechanisms, and outcomes, spirit of
various agreements (avoiding blames and counter blames) and come forward with
new commitments, necessary institutional arrangement and appropriate process
and procedure that ensure smooth transition from war to peace and address
genuine grievances of Nepalese people.
Coming years are not only
opportunities for Nepal’s peace, democracy and prosperity but also challenging
in achieving them. If the current crisis is not collectively taken by all
political parties as their common concern, we will not be able to manage
transition.
Nepal
needs long term security policy of the nation. Long term security policy of the
nation has to consider at least coming 5 decades of the possible security
scenarios in the region and international level. Restructuring of security
apparatus (army, police, intelligence), ministries (home and defence), National
Security Council should be guided by national security doctrine and policy,
international relations and economic policies with strong provision of civilian
control of the security sector and proper oversight from the parliament (Upreti
and Nepali, 2006).
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About
the author:
Bishnu Raj Upreti holds a PhD in conflict management (2001) from
[1] Since then, the
CPN (M) and the Unity Centre united in January 2009, the name CPN (M) was changed into the United
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or UCPN (M). Small breakaway faction of the
CPN (M) led by Matrika Yadav kept its original name CPN (M) even after the
formation of the UCPN (M). Again UCPN (M) Vice Chairman Mohan Baidhya, General
Secretry Ram Bahadur Thapa and other many senior leaders of the UCPN (M)
separated and formed the new party named as Communist party of Nepal-Maoist
(CPN-M).
[2] The 5622nd
Meeting of Security Council had established United Nations Political Mission in
Nepal (UNMIN) by unanimously adopting
the resolution 1740 (23 January 2007) as per the request of the Government of
Nepal and the CPN (M).
[3] All total
19604 people have been qualified from the UNMIN verification process.
[4]
For details about the Joint Monitoring Committee, see the decision (SC/8942) of
5622nd Meeting (PM) of the Security Council of UN.
[5] In any
war-torn countries one of the major challenges after signing the peace
agreements is maintaining security situation. Though the term, ‘post conflict’
is contested in Nepal particularly after the emergence of several small armed
groups and their engagement in violence, the operational definition of post
conflict is ‘a situation after the formal signing of the CPA on 21 November
2006 by the government and the CPN (M) that ends armed conflict and parties
earlier engaged in fights, violence and war start to implement the provisions
of the agreements’. The transitional security of Nepal particularly in Terai[5]
is severely challenged by small armed groups such as Janatantrik Terai Mukti
Morcha (Jwala Singh); Janatantrik Madesh Mukti Morcha (Goit), Janatantrik Terai
Mukti Morcha (Bisphot Singh), Madeshi Mukti Tiger, Terai Cobra; Python, Terai
Baggi, Terai Army, Madeshi Virus Killers Party, Royal Defence Army, Gorkha Line
Mukti Morcha, Liberation Tigers of Terai Ilem (LTTE), Kirat Workers Party
(mainly Udayapur and Khotang). In addition to these armed groups, there are
other criminal groups active in Terai (Chhotelal Sahani; Sanju Baba, Raju Singh
Rathor and Munna Singh Groups are few of many others mainly operating from
India), rural areas and towns and creating severe insecurity and violence. This
is serious immediate security concern that state has to address (Upreti,
2008e). Nepalese people are seriously suffering from insecurity and violence.
Phenomena of criminality led insecurity such as kidnapping of children, murder
and attempted murder, rubbery, illegal trafficking of arms and ammunitions,
human trafficking, drugs abuses and trafficking, atrocities, murders, killings,
massacres, forced displacement became serious (Upreti and Nepali, 2006). This
phenomenon, particularly from Terai is growing particularly after signing of
the CPA. The transitional situation is getting further complicated after
creation of the coercive nature of organisations such as Young Communist League[5]
(YCL), Youth Force (YF) and Madesh
Rakshya Bahini by political parties. The official justification of need for
creation of such forces by political parties does not match with the actions.
The only legally defined institutions such as police, army and private security
system approved by the government have coercive rights. However, these
organisations are operating without any legal mandate that consequently weakens
state security apparatus, creates parallel functioning and adds insecurity. Any
one can easily understand that coercive forces created by political parties
serve their vested interests. Once powerful political parties have created such
coercive forces severely weakened police force (by politicisation or political
protection) can not contain them. Hence, Nepal’s security situation is facing
dilemma.
[6] Political
parties are the leading force in nation building and democracy and their
governing style determines destiny of this country. Support to democratise
political parties, promoting internal democracy and development of younger
leadership are crucially important to make transformation successful. The
practices of exclusion and under recognition in political process are the
outcome of feudal mindset and changing such attitude requires intimate
engagement and dialogue-cum-practice.
[7]
Reconstruction and development is one
of the most important elements in achieving peace and stability. New vision,
new policy, new strategy, new institutional arrangement, new methodological
approaches and fresh perspective on development are essential to make
development sector responsive and contributing to make peace process
successful. Adopting conflict sensitive development approaches is one of the
main options for policy makers to maximise the contribution of development
sector in achieving sustainable peace, social harmony and living standard of
Nepalese people. The newly created Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction has
central role in developing conflict sensitive development vision, policies and
strategies for the promotion of reconstruction and development.
[8] The groups
calling bandhs and blockade were businesspeople, CPN (M) affiliated
organisations, JTMM (JS), Limbuwan-related parties, Chure-Bhabar Ekata Samaj,
Madhesi People's Right Forum, Madhesi Revolutionary Front, Madhesi Tiger,
conflict victims, local communities, different wings of major seven parties,
independent student groups, transport unions, dalit and janajati organisations,
Tamang Autonomous Region Democratic Front, United Tharu National Liberation
Front and other groups (see OCHA report of August 2007 for detail).
[9] When the UCPN
(M) leader, Pushpa Kamal Dahal ’Prachanda’, was selected as the first elected
Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal (second communist
prime minister after the late Manamohan Adhikari), the UCPN (M) declared that
they would demilitarise the YCL. This provision came as a result of the
Seven-Point Agreement reached between three major parties on the formation of a
coalition government. However, it has not happen.
