Peace and post conflict
reconstruction in Nepal: A bird’s-eye view[1]
Bishnu Raj Upreti,
PhD (conflict Management)
1. The context
Peace refers to a state of
social, psychological, physical and spiritual wellbeing on an individual and
society as a whole (Barnes 2002; Upreti, 2010). In the context of Nepal, a
country emerging from the decade-long bloody war, peace is a state of restoring
normal relations among people and among institutions directly and or indirectly
affected by the armed conflict and addressing the root causes such as social
exclusion, marginalization, deprivation, mal-governance, social disharmony and
ethnic tension, as well as achieving social, psychological, mental, physical
and spiritual wellbeing (Upreti 2010). Nepalese society is fractured,
disconnected, frustrated and alienated from the decade long bloody war and
associated effects (Upreti, 2009). Therefore, achieving stability and peace in
Nepal requires appropriate process that deals with the past and envisions
better future by generating hope and aspiration. In this regard, peace building
is crucially important in Nepal and refers to strategies and actions to be
undertaken to institutionalize achievements made through the implementation of
provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA in Nepal has
envisioned the restructuring of the state because in the past it had largely failed
to deliver basic state functions. Building state therefore became imperative
(Upreti et al. 2010). At present Nepal is in the crossroad of critical
transition from war [between the state and the Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist) hereinafter referred to as UCPN
(Maoist)[2]
for a decade (1996-2006)] to peace (Upreti 2009). This paper discusses peace
and post-conflict reconstruction in Nepal.
The major causes of the Nepal's
armed and social conflicts were related to structural inequality, exclusion and
discrimination (based on caste, class, gender, geography), concentration and
abuse of power by ruling elites and bureaucracy, poverty and unemployment,
failure of state governing system and politically divided and opposing
ideologies (Upreti, 2006; 2009; 2010).
Table 1: Some
of the important agreements and
understandings related to Nepal’s peace process
|
S.N
|
Agreements
|
Date
signed
|
Signatories
parties/remarks
|
|
1
|
Twelve-Point
Agreement
|
22
November 2005
|
The
Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the CPN (Maoist)
|
|
2
|
Restoration
of Parliament through the Royal proclamation
|
24
April 2006
|
The
then King Gyanendra
|
|
3
|
Ceasefire
Code of Conduct
|
26
May 2006
|
Krishna
Prasad Sitaula on behalf of the GoN and Krishna Bahadur Mahara on behalf of
the CPN (Maoist)
|
|
4
|
Proclamation
of the House of Representatives
|
28
May 2006
|
Endorsed
by the House of Representatives
|
|
5
|
Interim
Legislature- Parliament to include the CPN (Maoist)
|
15
January 2007
|
The
GoN, the CPN (Maoist) and political parties
|
|
6
|
Interim
government including the CPN (Maoist)
|
1
April 2007
|
-
|
|
7
|
Joint
Letter to the United Nations
|
9
August 2006
|
The
GoN and the CPN (Maoist)
|
|
8
|
Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA)
|
21
November 2006
|
Prime
Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and CPN (Maoist) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal
‘Prachanda’
|
|
9
|
Agreement
on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA)
|
8
December 2006
|
Krishna
Prasad Sitaula on behalf of the GoN and Krishna Bahadur Mahara on behalf of
the CPN (Maoist), and witnessed by the UN Representative, Ian Martin
|
|
10
|
Promulgation
of the Interim Constitution 2007
|
15
January 2007
|
The
Interim Government
|
|
11
|
Arrival
of UNMIN
|
23
January 2007
|
The
GoN and the CPN (Maoist)
|
|
12
|
Start
of the verification process of the ex-combatants
|
15
June 2007
|
UNMIN
carried out the verification process
|
|
13
|
Completion
of the verification process of the ex-combatants
|
27
December 2007
|
UNMIN
completed the verification process
|
|
14
|
Constituent
Assembly election
|
10
April 2008
|
-
|
|
15
|
Formation
of the Special Committee (SC)
|
28
October 2008
|
The
GoN
|
|
16
|
Formation
of the Technical Committee (TC)
|
16
April 2009
|
The
GoN
|
|
17
|
Agreement
to discharge disqualified combatants
|
16
December 2009
|
The
GoN and the UCPN (Maoist)
|
|
18
|
Start
of the discharge process
|
7
January 2010
|
The
MoPR carried out the discharge process
|
|
19
|
Completion
of the discharge process
|
8
February 2010
|
Completion
of the discharge process
|
|
20
|
The
UCPN (Maoist) formally handed over the cantonments and the ex-combatants to
the SC for Supervision, Integration and rehabilitation
|
22
January 2011
|
The
GoN and the UCPN (Maoist)
|
|
21
|
Seven-Point
Agreement
|
1
November 2011
|
UCPN
(Maoist) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal, (Prachanda), NC President Sushil
Koirala, CPN-UML Chairman Jhala Nath Khanal and on behalf of Joint Madhesi
Democratic Front, Bijaya Kumar Gachhadar
|
|
22
|
Categorization
of the combatants
|
16
Nov. to 2 Dec.2011
|
The
(SC) and its Secretariat
|
|
23
|
Voluntary
retirement (1st installment)
Voluntary
retirement (2nd installment)
|
1
to 14 January 2012
31
Oct. to 10 Nov.2012
|
The
(SC) and its Secretariat
|
|
24
|
Integration
process into the Nepal Army
|
5
July to 20 November 2012
|
The
Nepal Army
|
|
25
|
The
SC dissolved following the completion of the integration and rehabilitation
process
|
12
April 2013
|
The
GoN
|
Source: Adapted from NIPS, 2013
The Table 1 is self explanatory
where some of the most important agreements and understandings reached during
the period between 2005 and 2013 to achieve durable peace in Nepal. Though they
were important in nature their sincere implementation or commitment of
political parties to these provisions were often questioned. The main reason
for such criticism was the attitude of political leaders to sign any
agreements/understandings without assessing the possible implications of each
of them or to shift the pressure at that particular time.
2. Pillars of peace
and post conflict state building of Nepal
The figure 1 shows the
interrelated components of Nepal's peace process. They are complementary and it
will be difficult to achieve peace without properly implementing these
components with full commitments and right institutional arrangements (Dobbins,
2007; Upreti, 2010).
Figure 1: Interrelated components
of peace process
2.1 Power sharing
It is widely
observed in the conflict ridden and war-to peace transition countries that
power sharing between the parties in conflict is one of the major determinants
of success or failure of peace process and the peace agreement (Armon et al.,
1996; Armon and Philipson 1998; Bloomfield 1997; Fisher et al., 2000; Galtung
2000; Lederach 1999; Linder 2005; Misra 2002; Rupesinghe 1998; Upreti 2008;
Aditya et al, 2006; OECD 2008). While looking to the Nepal’s power sharing arrangements,
many complications were observed as an outcomes of the weak, tactical and
opportunistic ways of handling the power sharing issue (Upreti 2010). The
figure 2 shows that power sharing provisions have not only to include the major
political forces (especially the parties in conflict) but also to proactively engage
local people in the process, as well as engaging key people, right persons in
right responsibility and bringing private sector and the international
community (Upreti 2009). In these aspect Nepal’s political decision makers were
not fully successful.
Figure 2: Elements of
power sharing
2.2 Handling the interests of international actors
Influence of different types of
international actors is common in peace process (Armon et al., 1996; Armon and
Philipson 1998; Misra 2002; Rupesinghe 1998; Upreti 2008). Hence, properly
dealing with international actors is integral part of the peace process. In
dealing with this group of actors three areas of their assessments (their
strategic interests, their ability to influence and their commitment to peace process) is
important to engage with them (Upreti 2010). Further, it is important to address
their genuine concerns such as corruption, ineffectiveness of their aids,
mal-governance, etc.
Figure 3: Components
of dealing with international actors
Nepal needs international support
to achieve its ambitious objectives of restoring peace, strengthening
democracy, achieving economic growth and effectively implementing the
post-conflict state building framework presented in this chapter. However, the
role of international community should be to facilitate and support the
initiatives of the government of Nepal, which is far different than what the
international community is doing in Nepal.
2.3 state
restructuring (including federalization)
State restructuring: It is a complex concept, process and outcome
(Upreti et al,. 2010). Security sector restructuring, restructuring of the
bureaucracy, finalisation of the form of government (presidential or prime
ministerial system, directly elected or indirectly elected head of the state
and government, etc.), defining federal government level (central, provincial
and local) and naming and demarcation of federal units, restructuring of
judiciary (and balancing between independence and accountability) some of the
important components of the state restructuring (See Figure 4).
 |
Figure 4: Important
elements of the state restructuring
2.4. Ensuring transitional justice
Transitional justice is related
to the rule of law, and dealing with the past (Upreti et al.,2009). Achieving
stability, peace and democracy requires vision, commitments and right institutional
arrangements. Based on extensive research on the issues of managing
post-conflict transitions and achieving peace, the author argues that first and
foremost important factor is to respect 'rule of law' (Bloomfield et al., 2003).
It ensures respecting human rights, exercising democratic practices and
effectively implements development agenda.
Dealing with the past basically
focuses to address the legacies of the armed conflict and move individuals and
society ahead by tacking the past (Upreti 2010). Figure 6 brings interrelated
components to be dealt n while talking about the dealing with past and ensuring
transitional justice.
Figure 5: Essential
components of transitional justice
Linking the national truth and
justice process to the local level, creating a mechanism to ensure
reconciliation and reintegration, providing justice to victims and survivors,
providing compensation, restitution and rehabilitation and implementing legal
provisions are important areas of focus in the future (Bloomfield et al., 2003).
Establishment of Truth and Reconciliation Commission, investigation commission
on disappeared people are also part of dealing with the past package. However,
in Nepal the establishment process of these commissions became extremely
lengthy (Just in 2014 they were agreed as opposed to the 6 months' provision of
the CPA) and highly controversial (the mandate and formation process is
challenged by some conflict victims and it is now under the supreme court
hearing).
Figure 6: different interrelated components of rule of law
and dealing with the past (transitional justice)
2.5 Post conflict reconstruction and development
Global conflict history has shown that relationship between conflict and development
mismatch is vivid (Sharma et al., 2014; Armon et al., 1996; Armon and
Philipson 1998; Bloomfield 1997; Fisher et al., 2000; Galtung 2000; Lederach
1999; Linder 2005; Misra 2002; Rupesinghe 1998; Upreti 2008; Aditya et al,
2006; OECD 2008). Nepalese experiences
of more than six decades of development assistance have amply
demonstrated that it can create inequality and feeling of injustice
consequently fuelling the conflict when it is not well targeted to poor and
marginalised people. Nepal's development history is largely a history of
failure (Sharma et al., 2014). It failed to adequately address poverty and
exclusion and widened gap between rich and poor (Upreti 2006; 2010). The
resources were captured by elite (Upreti 2009). Aid conditionality was also an important source
of increasing silent tensions (Sharma et al., 2014). It had largely prevented the government to
focus its development operations for long-term engagement to improve quality of
life (practical needs and strategic interests) of poor and disadvantaged
people.
Translation of visions, missions,
objectives and plan needs certain means. Policy, institutions, regulatory
framework and resource base are some these means by which post-conflict state
building can be achieved (Sharma et al., 2012; 2014).
Figure 7: Factors determining the
success of Reconstruction and development
Reconstructing of damaged
infrastructures, development of the new ones, redefining existing development
policy, regulatory frameworks and institutional arrangements in line with the
new structures of the federal state are fundamentally important to achieve
post-conflict stability and peace.
Table 2: Expenditure on reconstruction of infrastructure destroyed during
the armed conflict
|
S.N
|
Types of
infrastructures
|
No of reconstruction
of infrastructures
|
Expenditure
(Rs 000)
|
|
1
|
Schools
|
495
|
685,951
|
|
2
|
VDC offices
|
736
|
1,545,267
|
|
3
|
Government offices at district HQs
|
395
|
2,024,301
|
|
4
|
Government offices at local level
|
325
|
406,779
|
|
5
|
DDCs and municipalities
|
38
|
285,917
|
|
6
|
Suspension bridges
|
16
|
14,550
|
|
7
|
Other structures
|
487
|
1,586,213
|
Source:
NIPS, 2013
2.6
Institutionalization of provisions of peace agreement
Constitution making in the post-conflict context is basically a
process of institutionalization of provisions made in the peace agreement by
negotiating the main issues and incorporating them in the new constitution. IN
Nepal several important issues are unsettled yet at the political level. Some
of them are: defining the governing system (whether presidential system or parliamentary
system of mixed system); resolving the deeply contested state restructuring issues
(name, number and borders of provinces, authority and responsibility, etc); deciding
electoral system etc. Further, deciding the highly politicized issue of prior
rights and right to self determination while federalizing country is another
thorny issue. In this context, developing ownership and enhancing legitimacy of
constitution is a daunting challenge.
Figure 8: Components of institutionalization of provisions
of peace agreement (Constitution making)
2.7 Economic recovery and stability
Rebuilding economy is
fundamentally important to achieve stability, peace and democracy. Economic
development is one of the main stabilizing factors in post-conflict situation.
Creation of employment at local level and that of economic opportunities at
local level, establishment of production and processing industries, investment
in productive enterprises are important to generate employment. Effective
resource mobilization, outcome-oriented strategy and action, employment
generation, broad-based high economic growth, more investment in agriculture,
infrastructure (hydropower plants, road networks and airports), information and
communication technology, science and innovation, tourism, cooperatives, and
investment-friendly environment are some of the important components of
economic growth in the post-conflict situation.
 |
Figure 9: Components of economic
recovery and stability
The post-conflict
state building has to focus on linking development with economy. Economic
development assistance in the conflict-affected areas, economic policy reforms,
trade promotions (export and import), creation of market and jobs, intensive
investment in basic services such as education, health, drinking water, etc,
rural infrastructures development and rural investment, promotion of private
investment, modernisation of agriculture, land reform (land consolidation,
assuring land entitlement to tenants and landless, defining land ceiling,
land-use classification), rural entrepreneurship development, commercialisation
of prospects of bio-diversity, rural people's access to and benefit sharing in
natural resources (such as land, forest, water, mines, etc.) and public
resources, development of tourism industries and associate sectors,
exploitation of high potential of hydropower are some of the major areas of
economic development (Upreti 2010).
2.8 Political party reform
Political parties in Nepal are the key players
of state building as well as making the state dysfunctional by blatantly
politicising the state structures, process and procedures. Restructuring the
state and building new Nepali state is impossible without the reformation in
themselves. Therefore, post-conflict state building has also to focus on party
building process, as they are the pillars of multi-party democracy and
reservoir of the future leaders.
Figure 10:
Components of political party reform
2.9 National security
policy and restructuring of security sector
 |
Figure 11
Components of Restructuring of security sector and national security
policy
Dealing with the security issues
(security sector reform or modernization of transformation; addressing the
issues and concerns of ex-combatants, ensuring transitional security, etc.) is
one of the major concerns/challenges in achieving the peace and stability (Ebo
2005; Chifu et al., 2008; Green 2003; Schnabel and Ehrhart 2005Upreti and
Vanhoutte 2009). Proliferation and abuse of illegal small arms is one of the
main challenge at the time of conflict and post conflict context (Upreti and
Nepali 2006).
In Nepal, often peace process was
equated with the management and integration-rehabilitation of the ex-combatants
because this was one of the core contentions and powerful means of UCPNM to
threat to other party. Hence, this issue got national priority but was equally
contested. The table 3 gives the overall situation of the management and
integration-rehabilitation of the ex-combatants.
Table 3: Overview of the registration, verification and categorization of
ex-combatants
|
Registration and
verification process
|
Total
|
Male
|
Female
|
|
Total
number of registered ex-combatants
|
32,250
|
NA
|
NA
|
|
Total
number of ex-combatants verified by UNMIN
|
19,602
|
15,756 (80.37%)
|
3,846 (19.63%)
|
|
Total
number of weapons registered and stored in the containers
|
3,475
|
NAp
|
NAp
|
|
Absentees,
automatically considered as disqualified combatants, during the verification
process
|
8,640
|
NA
|
NA
|
|
Disqualified
combatants
|
|||
|
Under
the age of 18 as of 25 May 2006 (considered minors)
|
2,973
|
1,987 (66.85%)
|
986 (33.16%)
|
|
Late
recruits
|
1,035
|
804 (77.07%)
|
231 (22.31%)
|
|
Total
disqualified (minors + late recruits)
|
4,008
|
|
|
|
Outcome
of the Categorization process
|
|||
|
Number
of ex-combatants absent in the categorization process
|
2,456
|
NA
|
NA
|
|
Total
number of ex-combatants present in the categorization process
|
17,052
|
13,494 (79.13%)
|
3,558 (20.87%)
|
|
Dead,
suspended and deserters
|
94
|
NA
|
NA
|
|
Total
number of ex-combatants selected for integration
|
1,422
|
1,318 (92.69%)
|
104 (7.31%)
|
|
Total
number of ex-combatants opting for voluntary retirement
|
15,624
|
12,170 (77.89%)
|
3,454 (22.11%)
|
|
Total
number of ex-combatants opting for rehabilitation
|
6
|
6
|
0
|
Source: NIPS, 2013. NA = Not available; NAp = Not applicable
3. Local level peace building
efforts
One of the important components of achieving
durable peace in war-torn countries is the mobilisation of local human and
other resources. This is one of the important strategies of developing local
ownership and finally achieving the durable peace. In Nepal several efforts
have been made by national and local non-governmental organisations, community
based organisations, local offices of the government, private sector, media and
especially Local peace Committee. However, peace initiatives at local level are
uncoordinated, duplicated and scattered and therefore less effective. See the
figure....for the different components active at the local level peace building.
 |
Figure 12: Peace building efforts at Local
level by different actors
Local Peace Committee (LPC) was
supposed to facilitate peacemaking and peacebuilding processes at local levels
(I.e., district, municipalities and VDCs) as integral component of the national
peace process of Nepal. Though the MoPR is programmatically responsible for
implementing the LPC, the administrative bottlenecks and resource constraints made
LPC function difficult. In the peace process local level issues such as
addressing psychological effects and reconciliation did not get sufficient
attention and this gap was supposed to bridge by the LPC. Hence, LPC is
envisioned as a transitional mechanism to work on prevention or reduction of
violence, facilitate dialogues, reconciliation (as per the spirit of the
National Truth and Reconciliation Commission envisioned in the
CPA). However, because of composition of the committee (domination of the party
representatives), lack of required resources, weak administrative mandate
(assigned administrative authority of the Chief District Officer, who has so
many other mandates and many cases avoided to actively support the LPCs), LPC
became weak in performing its roles. However, LPCs in several districts are
working hard to promote peace at local level. The study of Mallik (2013) also
shows the similar result.
4. Unique
characteristics of Nepal’s peace and state building
Nepal is experiencing unique
characters in the context of ongoing political change and peace building
efforts. Some of the main characteristics are briefly presented in the
following paragraphs
4.1 Mismatch between rhetoric and reality:
It is one of the major characters
observed in the Nepal’s peace building process, post-conflict reconstruction
and state building. This is omnipresent everywhere in Nepal: in politics
business, academic institutions, social service, diplomatic community,
non-governmental organizations, government organizations, parliament,
judiciary, security, and civil society. Once such a situation is prevalent, powerful
actors are proactive in harnessing opportunities or escaping from the
responsibilities or fulfilling their vested interests. Though degree and
intensity vary, it is observed almost every powerful elite and neo-elite circle
(political party, civil society, and business sector and aid agencies).
It is very surprising to notice
that the duality and contradictions are observed everywhere: It can be vivid in
powerful political decision makers and influential circle. They say one thing
in public and do differently, which is easily accepted in Nepal. Consequently
it has developed as a social character. Though contradictions are integral
parts of everyday social life in post-peace agreement time in Nepal, degree and
intensity sharply increases in certain situations such as containing movements
of radicals or negotiating the power sharing. For example, every time when a
new government is formed, it brings some common minimum agenda to be respected
by the coalition partners. However, such governments never implement or only
selectively implement, if implement such agenda at all. Often, this very agenda
becomes source of tension among the coalition partners (e.g., the President and
Vice-president to be endorsed or elected by the Parliament was one of the
clauses of agreement between the NC-UML coalition government formed after the
election of the 2nd CA but it is not yet implemented and becoming a
source of tension among the coalition partners).
In principle, ethics,
accountability, responsibility and transparency are some of the important parameters
that have to guide action and behavior of people with high social standing like
politicians, government officials, civil society leaders or businessmen.
However, the rampant mismatch is the reality of Nepal that has massively
affected/influenced the Nepal’s peace process and state building dynamics.
4.2 Selective use of law, rules, or their ‘application on convenience’
Though state exercises some legal
provisions to shape human behaviour, effects of such legal interventions are
often observed as selective (used for poor, powerless but not properly enforced
over powerful, or used by the rulers to weaken opposition) and passive (deliberate
inaction for convenience of certain people). This situation has created massive
public distrust and negatively affecting to the peace and stability, democracy
and rules of law. Individuals and organisations responsible for exercising
legal provisions are themselves under massive influence of power and political rhetoric.
Hence, the application of rule of law is becoming a joke in Nepal, particularly
after signing the CPA as political leaders felt that they have the power to
change the constitution and rules if it is required to do so for their
benefits. Amendment of the interim constitution more than 11 times in the past
few years is the glaring example how rule of law is applied in Nepal. So rule
of law in Nepal is exercise on the basis of ‘application on convenience’.
4.3 One becomes successful only because of non-performing of others ’
Nepali politicians and political
parties in Nepal are largely getting benefits from the failure of others (be it
president/chairperson of party, or the failure of main opposition party). Almost
all political leaders (though the degree drastically vary) make huge promises
to go to power and once they are in power they forget, or ignore or even oppose
what they promised. Consequently, they lost trust of people and it becomes
difficult for them to get in power by fair means. Hence, they have to engage in
foul-play. As a result others who are less spoiled could gain for a certain
period and the cycle repeats.
Except few cases, the performance
of political leaders, the government, the political parties are largely weak,
they are often vision less, entangled too much in the present/events/cases
instead of looking for future. In such a situation, there is no chance for being
successful. Once the leaders in the governments fail, the frustrated mass goes
against the governments/leaders and gives sympathy to those who are out of
power. But the cycle continues. So, any party or collation of parties comes in
power to govern the country they perform badly and another group/party come in
power against the non-performers. In the past governments changed so many times
with this social psyche. The precise reason of the grand defeat of the UCPNM in
the 19 November 2013 CA election was because of it’s bad performance once it became
the largest party for the 1st CA election. The winning of the 2nd
CA election by the NC and CPN (UML) is not because they do well but because the
UCPNM performed badly.
Further, the UCPNM, one of the
major players of the war and peace, is rhetorically, ideologically; conceptually
or operationally confused and therefore inconsistencies and contradictions are their
common characters that not only weaken them but also severely affected the
Nepal’s peace process. Situation of other political parties (especially the
regional parties) is same.
4.5 High expectation and low delivery
Another factor
contributing to complicate the Nepal’s peace process is raised higher
expectation of people by political masters (they made unrealistic promises to
people) and extremely poor to deliver the promises they made to general public.
Rule of law, and governance (transparency, accountability, participation, etc)
are just for rhetoric and eye-wash. They are reflected every year in development
projects, strategy and operational procedures. As achieving durable peace is a
time-consuming social process, it requires leaders to be transparent and fair, and
they need to stop providing unrealistic promises to people and be consistent on
their saying and doing.
4.6. Unfinished business
Many issues discussed
in the section two are not yet finished or partly done. For example, security
sector transformation is
one of the key elements of peace process. The single most reason of increasing
number of the security forces of Nepal during the war time was the strengthening
the security forces to fight against the rebels. However, after the CPA this reason
does not hold any logic but there is no constructive discussion on the right
sizing of the security forces. The right sizing is possible only when we have
clear national security policy which is not really a priority of political
decision and policy makers.
Ensuring transitional justice is another pillar
of the successful peace process. In Nepal agreeing on the TRC took more than 6
years but the act became controversial and reached to court hearing. The
reparation to the conflict victim and psycho-social counselling is still an
issue. Providing peace dividends, reconstructions of the infrastructures are
half done and psycho-social counselling, reconciliation are not properly
started. The constitution making with the proper federalisation is the main
component of peace process, which is becoming a bone of contention, especially
with the federalisation. Economic
recovery development more said than done.
Land reform and socio-economic transformation were other promises made
in the CPA but they are not yet fully implemented despite few efforts made in
the past especially in creating high level land reform commission (good
recommendations available but implementation is problem).
5. Conclusions
Several conclusions can be drawn from
the above discussion on the Nepal’s peace process.
First, Nepal’s peace process is
becoming a more complicated with mix of success and weaknesses. There are few
good achievements like integration of the ex-combatants in the national army, election
of the Constituent Assembly, or inclusion of excluded in political
decision-making etc. However, there are several complications or less
emphasized issues that are extremely essential for peace process being
successful. These issues are ensuring
transitional security, implementing rule of law and ensure transitional
justice, dealing with international vested interests; neutralize radicalized
society; promoting communal harmony ethnic cooperation; depoliticizing religion;
address industrial unrests and trade unionism; dealing with organized
transnational crimes and proliferation of small arms; regulating porous borders
and criminal penetration; reorienting development and focusing on
unconventional security issues such as:
food, water, health, climate, education, climate & environmental
insecurities; land reform and socio-economic transformation.
Without addressing these issues
it will be hard to achieve the Nepal’s post-conflict state building objectives;
and achieving peace, justice, livelihood security and economic prosperity of
the people, providing security to its citizens. In case of Nepal, state
building, peace building and economic development are closely interlinked.
Therefore implementation of all the issues discussed in the earlier sections
should be the precondition of the political decision makers, policy makers and
planners, private sector, academics, non-governmental organizations,
cooperatives and international development partners)
The current peace
process of Nepal in my observation has a great opportunity for transforming the
centralized, exclusionary and ineffective state into a modern, prosperous and
inclusive nation. But peace and stability of Nepali state is possible only with
the due recognitions of the issues raised in this paper and reorienting the politics,
bureaucracy, security, private sector, NGO culture reform and economic growth (Upreti
2010). However, so
far, Nepal is missing a holistic understanding of peace process and complementarily
of the different components of the peace process discuss at the section 2 in
this paper.
Further, strong coordination mechanism
between concerned ministries and departments and the district level offices is
essential to strengthen the partially fragmented peace process of Nepal.
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About the author:
Bishnu Raj Upreti
Bishnu Raj Upreti
holds a PhD on Conflict Management from the Netherlands (1998-2000) and PostDoc
(2001-2003) from UK. He is currently working as Executive Director of Nepal
Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR); Country Team Leader of a) Sustainable
Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC), and b) Making Women Count for Peace:
Gender Empowerment and Conflict in South Asia, both multi-country research initiatives.
Dr. Upreti is engaged in research on conflict management, peace and
unconventional security (water, food, health, environment and political
security issues), state building related issues. He is known in this field
nationally and internationally. He has written and/or co-edited 40 books on
conflict, peace, state-building, and security and frequently published in
peer-reviewed international journals and anthologies. Besides research, he is
teaching conflict course and supervising PhD and masters students at School of
Arts, School of Management at and School of Education at Kathmandu University
and engaged as Visiting Fellow in several universities in Europe and USA.
Earlier, he has worked as a Research Fellow at King’s College London and Surrey
University, UK and South Asia Regional Coordinator of National Centre of
Competence in Research North-South. He is engaged with policy-makers,
politicians and the national and international media on Nepal’s armed conflict
and peace process. Dr Upreti is the Member of Advisory Boards of Executive Member:
Asia Pacific Peace Research Association (2012 to Mind-August 2014); Member
of Board of Trustees of International Foundation for Science (2014 to
2017), Member of Advisory Board of Centre for Unconventional
Security Affairs, of University of California, Irvine (2009 to date) and
advisor in other many different organization. In his study and professional career, he has visited more than 102
countries. He Corresponding email address is: bupreti@nccr.wlink.com.np
[1] Paper
prepared for the Nepal Government Employees Organisation
[2] The CPN
(Maoist) and the Unity Centre united in January 2009 and the name CPN (Maoist) was changed into the United Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoist) or UCPN
(Maoist). Small breakaway faction of the CPN
(Maoist) kept its original name CPN
(Maoist) after the formation of the UCPN (Maoist).
