Peace and post conflict reconstruction in Nepal

Peace and post conflict reconstruction in Nepal: A bird’s-eye view[1]

Bishnu Raj Upreti,

PhD (conflict Management)

1. The context

Peace refers to a state of social, psychological, physical and spiritual wellbeing on an individual and society as a whole (Barnes 2002; Upreti, 2010). In the context of Nepal, a country emerging from the decade-long bloody war, peace is a state of restoring normal relations among people and among institutions directly and or indirectly affected by the armed conflict and addressing the root causes such as social exclusion, marginalization, deprivation, mal-governance, social disharmony and ethnic tension, as well as achieving social, psychological, mental, physical and spiritual wellbeing (Upreti 2010). Nepalese society is fractured, disconnected, frustrated and alienated from the decade long bloody war and associated effects (Upreti, 2009). Therefore, achieving stability and peace in Nepal requires appropriate process that deals with the past and envisions better future by generating hope and aspiration. In this regard, peace building is crucially important in Nepal and refers to strategies and actions to be undertaken to institutionalize achievements made through the implementation of provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA in Nepal has envisioned the restructuring of the state because in the past it had largely failed to deliver basic state functions. Building state therefore became imperative (Upreti et al. 2010). At present Nepal is in the crossroad of critical transition from war [between the state and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) hereinafter referred to as UCPN (Maoist)[2] for a decade (1996-2006)] to peace (Upreti 2009). This paper discusses peace and post-conflict reconstruction in Nepal.

The major causes of the Nepal's armed and social conflicts were related to structural inequality, exclusion and discrimination (based on caste, class, gender, geography), concentration and abuse of power by ruling elites and bureaucracy, poverty and unemployment, failure of state governing system and politically divided and opposing ideologies (Upreti, 2006; 2009; 2010).

Table 1: Some of the important agreements and understandings related to Nepal’s peace process

S.N	Agreements	Date signed	Signatories parties/remarks
1	Twelve-Point Agreement	22 November 2005	The Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the CPN (Maoist)
2	Restoration of Parliament through the Royal proclamation	24 April 2006	The then King Gyanendra
3	Ceasefire Code of Conduct	26 May 2006	Krishna Prasad Sitaula on behalf of the GoN and Krishna Bahadur Mahara on behalf of the CPN (Maoist)
4	Proclamation of the House of Representatives	28 May 2006	Endorsed by the House of Representatives
5	Interim Legislature- Parliament to include the CPN (Maoist)	15 January 2007	The GoN, the CPN (Maoist) and political parties
6	Interim government including the CPN (Maoist)	1 April 2007	-
7	Joint Letter to the United Nations	9 August 2006	The GoN and the CPN (Maoist)
8	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)	21 November 2006	Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and CPN (Maoist) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’
9	Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA)	8 December 2006	Krishna Prasad Sitaula on behalf of the GoN and Krishna Bahadur Mahara on behalf of the CPN (Maoist), and witnessed by the UN Representative, Ian Martin
10	Promulgation of the Interim Constitution 2007	15 January 2007	The Interim Government
11	Arrival of UNMIN	23 January 2007	The GoN and the CPN (Maoist)
12	Start of the verification process of the ex-combatants	15 June 2007	UNMIN carried out the verification process
13	Completion of the verification process of the ex-combatants	27 December 2007	UNMIN completed the verification process
14	Constituent Assembly election	10 April 2008	-
15	Formation of the Special Committee (SC)	28 October 2008	The GoN
16	Formation of the Technical Committee (TC)	16 April 2009	The GoN
17	Agreement to discharge disqualified combatants	16 December 2009	The GoN and the UCPN (Maoist)
18	Start of the discharge process	7 January 2010	The MoPR carried out the discharge process
19	Completion of the discharge process	8 February 2010	Completion of the discharge process
20	The UCPN (Maoist) formally handed over the cantonments and the ex-combatants to the SC for Supervision, Integration and rehabilitation	22 January 2011	The GoN and the UCPN (Maoist)
21	Seven-Point Agreement	1 November 2011	UCPN (Maoist) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal, (Prachanda), NC President Sushil Koirala, CPN-UML Chairman Jhala Nath Khanal and on behalf of Joint Madhesi Democratic Front, Bijaya Kumar Gachhadar
22	Categorization of the combatants	16 Nov. to 2 Dec.2011	The (SC) and its Secretariat
23	Voluntary retirement (1st installment) Voluntary retirement (2nd installment)	1 to 14 January 2012 31 Oct. to 10 Nov.2012	The (SC) and its Secretariat
24	Integration process into the Nepal Army	5 July to 20 November 2012	The Nepal Army
25	The SC dissolved following the completion of the integration and rehabilitation process	12 April 2013	The GoN

Source: Adapted from NIPS, 2013

The Table 1 is self explanatory where some of the most important agreements and understandings reached during the period between 2005 and 2013 to achieve durable peace in Nepal. Though they were important in nature their sincere implementation or commitment of political parties to these provisions were often questioned. The main reason for such criticism was the attitude of political leaders to sign any agreements/understandings without assessing the possible implications of each of them or to shift the pressure at that particular time.

2. Pillars of peace and post conflict state building of Nepal   

The figure 1 shows the interrelated components of Nepal's peace process. They are complementary and it will be difficult to achieve peace without properly implementing these components with full commitments and right institutional arrangements (Dobbins, 2007; Upreti, 2010).  

Figure 1: Interrelated components of peace process 

2.1 Power sharing

It is widely observed in the conflict ridden and war-to peace transition countries that power sharing between the parties in conflict is one of the major determinants of success or failure of peace process and the peace agreement (Armon et al., 1996; Armon and Philipson 1998; Bloomfield 1997; Fisher et al., 2000; Galtung 2000; Lederach 1999; Linder 2005; Misra 2002; Rupesinghe 1998; Upreti 2008; Aditya et al, 2006; OECD 2008). While looking to the Nepal’s power sharing arrangements, many complications were observed as an outcomes of the weak, tactical and opportunistic ways of handling the power sharing issue (Upreti 2010). The figure 2 shows that power sharing provisions have not only to include the major political forces (especially the parties in conflict) but also to proactively engage local people in the process, as well as engaging key people, right persons in right responsibility and bringing private sector and the international community (Upreti 2009). In these aspect Nepal’s political decision makers were not fully successful.  

Figure 2: Elements of power sharing

2.2 Handling the interests of international actors  

Influence of different types of international actors is common in peace process (Armon et al., 1996; Armon and Philipson 1998; Misra 2002; Rupesinghe 1998; Upreti 2008). Hence, properly dealing with international actors is integral part of the peace process. In dealing with this group of actors three areas of their assessments (their strategic interests, their ability to influence  and their commitment to peace process) is important to engage with them (Upreti 2010). Further, it is important to address their genuine concerns such as corruption, ineffectiveness of their aids, mal-governance, etc.  

Figure 3: Components of dealing with international actors

Nepal needs international support to achieve its ambitious objectives of restoring peace, strengthening democracy, achieving economic growth and effectively implementing the post-conflict state building framework presented in this chapter. However, the role of international community should be to facilitate and support the initiatives of the government of Nepal, which is far different than what the international community is doing in Nepal.

2.3 state restructuring (including federalization)

State restructuring:  It is a complex concept, process and outcome (Upreti et al,. 2010). Security sector restructuring, restructuring of the bureaucracy, finalisation of the form of government (presidential or prime ministerial system, directly elected or indirectly elected head of the state and government, etc.), defining federal government level (central, provincial and local) and naming and demarcation of federal units, restructuring of judiciary (and balancing between independence and accountability) some of the important components of the state restructuring (See Figure 4).

 

Figure 4: Important elements of the state restructuring

2.4. Ensuring transitional justice

Transitional justice is related to the rule of law, and dealing with the past (Upreti et al.,2009). Achieving stability, peace and democracy requires vision, commitments and right institutional arrangements. Based on extensive research on the issues of managing post-conflict transitions and achieving peace, the author argues that first and foremost important factor is to respect 'rule of law' (Bloomfield et al., 2003). It ensures respecting human rights, exercising democratic practices and effectively implements development agenda.

Dealing with the past basically focuses to address the legacies of the armed conflict and move individuals and society ahead by tacking the past (Upreti 2010). Figure 6 brings interrelated components to be dealt n while talking about the dealing with past and ensuring transitional justice.

Figure 5: Essential components of transitional justice

Linking the national truth and justice process to the local level, creating a mechanism to ensure reconciliation and reintegration, providing justice to victims and survivors, providing compensation, restitution and rehabilitation and implementing legal provisions are important areas of focus in the future (Bloomfield et al., 2003). Establishment of Truth and Reconciliation Commission, investigation commission on disappeared people are also part of dealing with the past package. However, in Nepal the establishment process of these commissions became extremely lengthy (Just in 2014 they were agreed as opposed to the 6 months' provision of the CPA) and highly controversial (the mandate and formation process is challenged by some conflict victims and it is now under the supreme court hearing).   

Figure 6: different interrelated components of rule of law and dealing with the past (transitional justice)

2.5 Post conflict reconstruction and development

Global conflict history has shown that relationship between conflict and development mismatch is vivid (Sharma et al., 2014; Armon et al., 1996; Armon and Philipson 1998; Bloomfield 1997; Fisher et al., 2000; Galtung 2000; Lederach 1999; Linder 2005; Misra 2002; Rupesinghe 1998; Upreti 2008; Aditya et al, 2006; OECD 2008). Nepalese experiences of more than six decades of development assistance have amply demonstrated that it can create inequality and feeling of injustice consequently fuelling the conflict when it is not well targeted to poor and marginalised people. Nepal's development history is largely a history of failure (Sharma et al., 2014). It failed to adequately address poverty and exclusion and widened gap between rich and poor (Upreti 2006; 2010). The resources were captured by elite (Upreti 2009). Aid conditionality was also an important source of increasing silent tensions (Sharma et al., 2014). It had largely prevented the government to focus its development operations for long-term engagement to improve quality of life (practical needs and strategic interests) of poor and disadvantaged people.

Translation of visions, missions, objectives and plan needs certain means. Policy, institutions, regulatory framework and resource base are some these means by which post-conflict state building can be achieved (Sharma et al., 2012; 2014).

Figure 7: Factors determining the success of Reconstruction and development

Reconstructing of damaged infrastructures, development of the new ones, redefining existing development policy, regulatory frameworks and institutional arrangements in line with the new structures of the federal state are fundamentally important to achieve post-conflict stability and peace.

Table 2: Expenditure on reconstruction of infrastructure destroyed during the armed conflict

S.N	Types of infrastructures	No of reconstruction of infrastructures	Expenditure (Rs 000)
1	Schools	495	685,951
2	VDC offices	736	1,545,267
3	Government offices at district HQs	395	2,024,301
4	Government offices at local level	325	406,779
5	DDCs and municipalities	38	285,917
6	Suspension bridges	16	14,550
7	Other structures	487	1,586,213

Source: NIPS, 2013

2.6 Institutionalization of provisions of peace agreement

Constitution making in the post-conflict context is basically a process of institutionalization of provisions made in the peace agreement by negotiating the main issues and incorporating them in the new constitution. IN Nepal several important issues are unsettled yet at the political level. Some of them are: defining the governing system (whether presidential system or parliamentary system of mixed system); resolving the deeply contested state restructuring issues (name, number and borders of provinces, authority and responsibility, etc); deciding electoral system etc. Further, deciding the highly politicized issue of prior rights and right to self determination while federalizing country is another thorny issue. In this context, developing ownership and enhancing legitimacy of constitution is a daunting challenge.

 

Figure 8: Components of institutionalization of provisions of peace agreement (Constitution making)

2.7 Economic recovery and stability

Rebuilding economy is fundamentally important to achieve stability, peace and democracy. Economic development is one of the main stabilizing factors in post-conflict situation. Creation of employment at local level and that of economic opportunities at local level, establishment of production and processing industries, investment in productive enterprises are important to generate employment. Effective resource mobilization, outcome-oriented strategy and action, employment generation, broad-based high economic growth, more investment in agriculture, infrastructure (hydropower plants, road networks and airports), information and communication technology, science and innovation, tourism, cooperatives, and investment-friendly environment are some of the important components of economic growth in the post-conflict situation.

 

Figure 9: Components of economic recovery and stability  

The post-conflict state building has to focus on linking development with economy. Economic development assistance in the conflict-affected areas, economic policy reforms, trade promotions (export and import), creation of market and jobs, intensive investment in basic services such as education, health, drinking water, etc, rural infrastructures development and rural investment, promotion of private investment, modernisation of agriculture, land reform (land consolidation, assuring land entitlement to tenants and landless, defining land ceiling, land-use classification), rural entrepreneurship development, commercialisation of prospects of bio-diversity, rural people's access to and benefit sharing in natural resources (such as land, forest, water, mines, etc.) and public resources, development of tourism industries and associate sectors, exploitation of high potential of hydropower are some of the major areas of economic development (Upreti 2010).

2.8 Political party reform

Political parties in Nepal are the key players of state building as well as making the state dysfunctional by blatantly politicising the state structures, process and procedures. Restructuring the state and building new Nepali state is impossible without the reformation in themselves. Therefore, post-conflict state building has also to focus on party building process, as they are the pillars of multi-party democracy and reservoir of the future leaders.

Figure 10: Components of political party reform

2.9 National security policy and restructuring of security sector

 

Figure 11 Components of Restructuring of security sector and national security policy

Dealing with the security issues (security sector reform or modernization of transformation; addressing the issues and concerns of ex-combatants, ensuring transitional security, etc.) is one of the major concerns/challenges in achieving the peace and stability (Ebo 2005; Chifu et al., 2008; Green 2003; Schnabel and Ehrhart 2005Upreti and Vanhoutte 2009). Proliferation and abuse of illegal small arms is one of the main challenge at the time of conflict and post conflict context (Upreti and Nepali 2006).  

In Nepal, often peace process was equated with the management and integration-rehabilitation of the ex-combatants because this was one of the core contentions and powerful means of UCPNM to threat to other party. Hence, this issue got national priority but was equally contested. The table 3 gives the overall situation of the management and integration-rehabilitation of the ex-combatants.

Table 3: Overview of the registration, verification and categorization of ex-combatants

Registration and verification process	Total	Male	Female
Total number of registered ex-combatants	32,250	NA	NA
Total number of ex-combatants verified by UNMIN	19,602	15,756 (80.37%)	3,846 (19.63%)
Total number of weapons registered and stored in the containers	3,475	NAp	NAp
Absentees, automatically considered as dis­qualified combatants, during the verification process	8,640	NA	NA
Disqualified combatants
Under the age of 18 as of 25 May 2006 (con­sidered minors)	2,973	1,987 (66.85%)	986 (33.16%)
Late recruits	1,035	804 (77.07%)	231 (22.31%)
Total disqualified (minors + late recruits)	4,008
Outcome of the Categorization process
Number of ex-combatants absent in the cat­egorization process	2,456	NA	NA
Total number of ex-combatants present in the categorization process	17,052	13,494 (79.13%)	3,558 (20.87%)
Dead, suspended and deserters	94	NA	NA
Total number of ex-combatants selected for integration	1,422	1,318 (92.69%)	104 (7.31%)
Total number of ex-combatants opting for voluntary retirement	15,624	12,170 (77.89%)	3,454 (22.11%)
Total number of ex-combatants opting for rehabilitation	6	6	0

Source: NIPS, 2013. NA = Not available; NAp = Not applicable

3. Local level peace building efforts

One of the important components of achieving durable peace in war-torn countries is the mobilisation of local human and other resources. This is one of the important strategies of developing local ownership and finally achieving the durable peace. In Nepal several efforts have been made by national and local non-governmental organisations, community based organisations, local offices of the government, private sector, media and especially Local peace Committee. However, peace initiatives at local level are uncoordinated, duplicated and scattered and therefore less effective. See the figure....for the different components active at the local level peace building.

 

Figure 12: Peace building efforts at Local level by different actors

Local Peace Committee (LPC) was supposed to facilitate peacemaking and peacebuilding processes at local levels (I.e., district, municipalities and VDCs) as integral component of the national peace process of Nepal. Though the MoPR is programmatically responsible for implementing the LPC, the administrative bottlenecks and resource constraints made LPC function difficult. In the peace process local level issues such as addressing psychological effects and reconciliation did not get sufficient attention and this gap was supposed to bridge by the LPC. Hence, LPC is envisioned as a transitional mechanism to work on prevention or reduction of violence, facilitate dialogues, reconciliation (as per the spirit of the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission envisioned in the CPA). However, because of composition of the committee (domination of the party representatives), lack of required resources, weak administrative mandate (assigned administrative authority of the Chief District Officer, who has so many other mandates and many cases avoided to actively support the LPCs), LPC became weak in performing its roles. However, LPCs in several districts are working hard to promote peace at local level. The study of Mallik (2013) also shows the similar result.

4. Unique characteristics of Nepal’s peace and state building

Nepal is experiencing unique characters in the context of ongoing political change and peace building efforts. Some of the main characteristics are briefly presented in the following paragraphs

4.1 Mismatch between rhetoric and reality:

It is one of the major characters observed in the Nepal’s peace building process, post-conflict reconstruction and state building. This is omnipresent everywhere in Nepal: in politics business, academic institutions, social service, diplomatic community, non-governmental organizations, government organizations, parliament, judiciary, security, and civil society. Once such a situation is prevalent, powerful actors are proactive in harnessing opportunities or escaping from the responsibilities or fulfilling their vested interests. Though degree and intensity vary, it is observed almost every powerful elite and neo-elite circle (political party, civil society, and business sector and aid agencies).

It is very surprising to notice that the duality and contradictions are observed everywhere: It can be vivid in powerful political decision makers and influential circle. They say one thing in public and do differently, which is easily accepted in Nepal. Consequently it has developed as a social character. Though contradictions are integral parts of everyday social life in post-peace agreement time in Nepal, degree and intensity sharply increases in certain situations such as containing movements of radicals or negotiating the power sharing. For example, every time when a new government is formed, it brings some common minimum agenda to be respected by the coalition partners. However, such governments never implement or only selectively implement, if implement such agenda at all. Often, this very agenda becomes source of tension among the coalition partners (e.g., the President and Vice-president to be endorsed or elected by the Parliament was one of the clauses of agreement between the NC-UML coalition government formed after the election of the 2^nd CA but it is not yet implemented and becoming a source of tension among the coalition partners).

In principle, ethics, accountability, responsibility and transparency are some of the important parameters that have to guide action and behavior of people with high social standing like politicians, government officials, civil society leaders or businessmen. However, the rampant mismatch is the reality of Nepal that has massively affected/influenced the Nepal’s peace process and state building dynamics.

4.2 Selective use of law, rules, or their ‘application on convenience’

Though state exercises some legal provisions to shape human behaviour, effects of such legal interventions are often observed as selective (used for poor, powerless but not properly enforced over powerful, or used by the rulers to weaken opposition) and passive (deliberate inaction for convenience of certain people). This situation has created massive public distrust and negatively affecting to the peace and stability, democracy and rules of law. Individuals and organisations responsible for exercising legal provisions are themselves under massive influence of power and political rhetoric. Hence, the application of rule of law is becoming a joke in Nepal, particularly after signing the CPA as political leaders felt that they have the power to change the constitution and rules if it is required to do so for their benefits. Amendment of the interim constitution more than 11 times in the past few years is the glaring example how rule of law is applied in Nepal. So rule of law in Nepal is exercise on the basis of ‘application on convenience’.

4.3 One becomes successful only because of non-performing of others ’

Nepali politicians and political parties in Nepal are largely getting benefits from the failure of others (be it president/chairperson of party, or the failure of main opposition party). Almost all political leaders (though the degree drastically vary) make huge promises to go to power and once they are in power they forget, or ignore or even oppose what they promised. Consequently, they lost trust of people and it becomes difficult for them to get in power by fair means. Hence, they have to engage in foul-play. As a result others who are less spoiled could gain for a certain period and the cycle repeats.

Except few cases, the performance of political leaders, the government, the political parties are largely weak, they are often vision less, entangled too much in the present/events/cases instead of looking for future. In such a situation, there is no chance for being successful. Once the leaders in the governments fail, the frustrated mass goes against the governments/leaders and gives sympathy to those who are out of power. But the cycle continues. So, any party or collation of parties comes in power to govern the country they perform badly and another group/party come in power against the non-performers. In the past governments changed so many times with this social psyche. The precise reason of the grand defeat of the UCPNM in the 19 November 2013 CA election was because of it’s bad performance once it became the largest party for the 1^st CA election. The winning of the 2^nd CA election by the NC and CPN (UML) is not because they do well but because the UCPNM performed badly.

Further, the UCPNM, one of the major players of the war and peace, is rhetorically, ideologically; conceptually or operationally confused and therefore inconsistencies and contradictions are their common characters that not only weaken them but also severely affected the Nepal’s peace process. Situation of other political parties (especially the regional parties) is same.

4.5 High expectation and low delivery

Another factor contributing to complicate the Nepal’s peace process is raised higher expectation of people by political masters (they made unrealistic promises to people) and extremely poor to deliver the promises they made to general public. Rule of law, and governance (transparency, accountability, participation, etc) are just for rhetoric and eye-wash. They are reflected every year in development projects, strategy and operational procedures. As achieving durable peace is a time-consuming social process, it requires leaders to be transparent and fair, and they need to stop providing unrealistic promises to people and be consistent on their saying and doing.

4.6. Unfinished business

Many issues discussed in the section two are not yet finished or partly done. For example, security sector transformation is one of the key elements of peace process. The single most reason of increasing number of the security forces of Nepal during the war time was the strengthening the security forces to fight against the rebels. However, after the CPA this reason does not hold any logic but there is no constructive discussion on the right sizing of the security forces. The right sizing is possible only when we have clear national security policy which is not really a priority of political decision and policy makers.

Ensuring transitional justice is another pillar of the successful peace process. In Nepal agreeing on the TRC took more than 6 years but the act became controversial and reached to court hearing. The reparation to the conflict victim and psycho-social counselling is still an issue. Providing peace dividends, reconstructions of the infrastructures are half done and psycho-social counselling, reconciliation are not properly started. The constitution making with the proper federalisation is the main component of peace process, which is becoming a bone of contention, especially with the federalisation.  Economic recovery development more said than done.  Land reform and socio-economic transformation were other promises made in the CPA but they are not yet fully implemented despite few efforts made in the past especially in creating high level land reform commission (good recommendations available but implementation is problem).

5. Conclusions

Several conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion on the Nepal’s peace process.

First, Nepal’s peace process is becoming a more complicated with mix of success and weaknesses. There are few good achievements like integration of the ex-combatants in the national army, election of the Constituent Assembly, or inclusion of excluded in political decision-making etc. However, there are several complications or less emphasized issues that are extremely essential for peace process being successful. These issues are  ensuring transitional security, implementing rule of law and ensure transitional justice, dealing with international vested interests; neutralize radicalized society; promoting communal harmony ethnic cooperation; depoliticizing religion; address industrial unrests and trade unionism; dealing with organized transnational crimes and proliferation of small arms; regulating porous borders and criminal penetration; reorienting development and focusing on unconventional security  issues such as: food, water, health, climate, education, climate & environmental insecurities; land reform and socio-economic transformation.  

Without addressing these issues it will be hard to achieve the Nepal’s post-conflict state building objectives; and achieving peace, justice, livelihood security and economic prosperity of the people, providing security to its citizens. In case of Nepal, state building, peace building and economic development are closely interlinked. Therefore implementation of all the issues discussed in the earlier sections should be the precondition of the political decision makers, policy makers and planners, private sector, academics, non-governmental organizations, cooperatives and international development partners)

The current peace process of Nepal in my observation has a great opportunity for transforming the centralized, exclusionary and ineffective state into a modern, prosperous and inclusive nation. But peace and stability of Nepali state is possible only with the due recognitions of the issues raised in this paper and reorienting the politics, bureaucracy, security, private sector, NGO culture  reform and economic growth (Upreti 2010). However, so far, Nepal is missing a holistic understanding of peace process and complementarily of the different components of the peace process discuss at the section 2 in this paper.

Further, strong coordination mechanism between concerned ministries and departments and the district level offices is essential to strengthen the partially fragmented peace process of Nepal.  

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30.     Upreti, B. R. Sharma, S. R., Pyakuryal, K.N. and Ghimire S. (2010), The Remake of a State: Post -conflict Challenges and State building in Nepal. Kathmandu: KU-HNRSC and RCO NCCR North-South.

About the author: Bishnu Raj Upreti

Bishnu Raj Upreti holds a PhD on Conflict Management from the Netherlands (1998-2000) and PostDoc (2001-2003) from UK. He is currently working as Executive Director of Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR); Country Team Leader of a) Sustainable Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC), and b) Making Women Count for Peace: Gender Empowerment and Conflict in South Asia, both multi-country research initiatives. Dr. Upreti is engaged in research on conflict management, peace and unconventional security (water, food, health, environment and political security issues), state building related issues. He is known in this field nationally and internationally. He has written and/or co-edited 40 books on conflict, peace, state-building, and security and frequently published in peer-reviewed international journals and anthologies. Besides research, he is teaching conflict course and supervising PhD and masters students at School of Arts, School of Management at and School of Education at Kathmandu University and engaged as Visiting Fellow in several universities in Europe and USA. Earlier, he has worked as a Research Fellow at King’s College London and Surrey University, UK and South Asia Regional Coordinator of National Centre of Competence in Research North-South. He is engaged with policy-makers, politicians and the national and international media on Nepal’s armed conflict and peace process. Dr Upreti is the Member of Advisory Boards of Executive Member: Asia Pacific Peace Research Association (2012 to Mind-August 2014); Member of Board of Trustees of International Foundation for Science (2014 to 2017), Member of Advisory Board of Centre for Unconventional Security Affairs, of University of California, Irvine (2009 to date) and advisor in other many different organization. In his study and professional career, he has visited more than 102 countries. He Corresponding email address is: bupreti@nccr.wlink.com.np

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[1] Paper prepared for the Nepal Government Employees Organisation

[2] The CPN (Maoist) and the Unity Centre united in January 2009 and the name CPN (Maoist) was changed into the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or UCPN (Maoist). Small breakaway faction of the CPN (Maoist) kept its original name CPN (Maoist) after the formation of the UCPN (Maoist).