Management of post conflict political transition in Nepal: Challenges and Opportunities

Management of post conflict political transition in Nepal: Challenges and Opportunities

Theme paper prepared for the presentation at the title … Conference of Management Association of Nepal (MAN) on 8 February 2013 in Hotel Annapurna, Durbarmarg, Kathmandu.

Bishnu Raj Upreti, PhD

Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR)

South Asia Regional Office of National Centre of Competence in Research North-South

Kathmandu

8 February 2012

1. Introduction

1.1 Understanding transition management:

Transition management in the context of this paper is defined as a governing process that addresses the new issues and challenges emerged from the boarder political changes in Nepal and contribute to bring desirable socio-political outcomes (peace, stability and prosperity). Hence, managing transition requires combination tools and techniques, perspectives and determination, vision and commitment, flexibility and risk taking ability of leadership. As transition management is being a process, working with guiding frameworks and procedures for achieving a desirable outcomes, it require mobilisation of collective and individual agency of transition managers (in our case the political decision makers) and other key stakeholders. Transition management is therefore a gradual, evolutionary (Rotmans et al., 20010 and continuous process of managing socio-political uncertainties and complications arise from the deliberate, vested interests of powerful actors as well as societal requirements for the change process. Hence transition management is a complex and complicated in nature (Bauman, 1991; Elzen and Wieczorek, 2005; Kemp and Loorback, 2006; Rip, 2006; Smith et al., 2005; Swyngedouw, 2006 and Voss and Kemp, 2005) and success depends upon the quality of the transition managers (political leadership) openness, commitment, flexibility, learning attitude (reflecting and learning from the mistakes and weaknesses), skill and knowledge, resource (human, physical and financial) management and situation analysis ability. It is rare to find all these qualities with single leader and therefore it requires a collective efforts from wider section of society, which is called as participatory transition management process, where all stakeholders will have space to contribute in the transition management as per their ability and willingness (Upreti, 2009). Hence, one of the most important tasks of political leadership is to crate space (mechanisms, procedures, provisions) for wider participation of concerned stakeholders that ensure the greater ownership and political change process become stable (upreti, 2010; Upreti et al.,  2010; Upreti, 2009).    

I argue that transition management is not what political and policy decision makers are currently practicing in Nepal and successful management of transition requires fundamental and structural departure from the current actions and behaviour to create enabling, facilitating and cooperating environment at all levels. Unlike at the time of stable situation, transition managers must steer the process, not dictate, control and impose, which is often the case. Rebuilding heavily politicised, divided and fractured Nepali society, de-radicalised and de-militarised radicalised and militarised youths, reinvigorate the failing economy, regaining lost hope and trust of people over the political change, ensuring transitional security and justice, implementing rule of law and exercising law and order in society, balancing national interests and international relations, improving governance are fundamental issues in Nepal’s political transition that require concerted efforts of all sectors of society (private sector, civil society, academia, media, political forces, farmers, intellectuals, professional groups etc.) and political and policy decision makers (transition managers) have the prime responsibility to provide space, scope and environment for such concerted actions.     

1.2 Defining Nepal’s post-conflict transition period:

Nepal is entering into the post conflict phase after the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by the then rebel leader Prachanda and the Prime minister in 21 November 2006 on the behalf of Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the government of Nepal (representing the Seven Party alliance). Post conflict is a contested terminology because of its fuzzy boundaries. The main contention is on unclear timing about when it starts and when it ends. However, from the perspective of peace, it is a time span between the signing of peace agreement to the completion of implementation of provisions mentioned in the agreements, which is often completed once the new constitution (either revised or re-written) starts fully functioning. Hence it is a situation of transition from conflict to peace (Upreti, 2010).

1.3 Defining Peace:

Peace refers to a state of social, psychological, physical, and spiritual wellbeing of an individual and society as whole. However, in Nepal’s context, where society was badly affected from the decade-long armed conflict and its residual negative effects, peace is a state when there is restoration of normal relations among people and institutions directly and/or indirectly affected by the armed conflict. It includes addressing the root causes of conflict such as social exclusion, marginalisation, deprivation, malgovernance, social disharmony, and ethnic tension. It also aims at achieving social, psychological, mental, physical, and spiritual wellbeing of the people. For that reason, achieving stability and peace in Nepal requires appropriate process that deals with the past and envisions better future by generating hope and aspirations among people. In this regard, ‘transition from war to peace’ refers to strategies and actions to be undertaken to nstitutionalize the achievements made so far. It is possible through the implementation of provisions of peace agreement towards achieving normalcy and stability (Upreti and Ghimire, 2012).

1.4 Objective and scope:

Objective of this paper is t initiate debate on the different aspects of the transition management with the special reference to Nepal’s current political process. 

This scope of paper is pragmatically confined to the management approaches and practical aspects rather than debating on the theoretical aspects of transition management to make it more relevant to political and policy decision making levels.

1. The context: complicated political transition and unfinished peace process

Nepal has experienced deadly armed conflict for a decade (13 February 1996 to 21 November 2006), which was first started on 13 February 1996 by the then Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [CPN (M)][1] as a small rebellion in the four western hill districts of Nepal and quickly expanded all over the country and posed severe threat to human security in the country (Upreti, 2004; Pyakuryal et al., 2008). Since 21 November 2006, Nepal has entered into new era when the Government and the CPN (M) signed the historic peace agreement and provided hope for the millions of Nepali people (Upreti, 2010), which is now fading off. 

The 12-point understanding between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and then CPN (M) and subsequent people’s movement of April 2006 provided fundamental basis for ending armed conflict and restoring peace. Signing of the CPA and invitation to the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)[2], Agreement on Management of Arms and Armies, the promulgation of the Interim Constitution, formation of the Interim Legislative Parliament and the Interim Government, completion of the verification process[3] of the ex-combatants by a Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee[4]; election of the Constituent Assembly (CA), declaration of Nepal as 'Democratic Republic' by the 1^st meeting of the CA  on 28 May 2008 were some of the frequented reiterated major achievements in the past. However, political parties and the CA failed to agree on some of the fundamental issues and therefore the 4 times extended Constituent Assembly expired without giving constitution to the nation. The peace process became hostage of political vested interests of parties and leaders, and the nation’s economic development shrunk and society divided. The selective implementation of rule of law, politicisation and crime and criminalisation of politics, ethnic, religious and geographical radicalisation and militarisation of youth, trade unionism and politicisation of state institutions (recruitment in the senior positions in the constitutional bodies, commissions, corporations, universities, based on the party membership and or donation), and governance crisis have  pushed the country into a uncertain, complicated and potentially risky transition.

1.1  Unfinished peace process

In general, peace refers to the state of social, psychological, physical, and spiritual wellbeing on an individual. In the context of Nepal, the peace is a state of restoring normalcy and or improving relations between people and between institutions directly and or indirectly affected by the 10 years of armed conflict and six years of mistrust, ethnic divide and radicalisation, addressing the legacy of conflict and achieving social, psychological, physical, and spiritual wellbeing of individual Nepalese people (Upreti, 2009). Peace process in the context of the armed conflict is continuous phenomenon of undertaking the contents, methodology and outcomes related to end the armed violence, undertake the peace talks, reach negotiations and address the legacy of the armed conflict bring the situation in normal or improved stage (Upreti, 2010). Addressing legacies of conflict is also called as post conflict situation.

Many countries such as Rwanda, Iraq, and Afghanistan had different approach in bringing the warring parties to an agreement (Upreti and Ghimire, 2012). They either made a military victory over the warring party or an outside intervention was used as the most fundamental power for that purpose. Unlike theirs, peace process in Nepal was the result of strategic equilibrium (neither party won or lose) as it was neither initiated out of a clear military victory of a warring party over the other nor by a direct external military intervention. The CPA, was the result of strategic equilibrium and therefore the major political forces should have moral and legal responsibilities in implementing, monitoring, and coordinating the peace process. However, the initial spirit of cooperation at the time of signing the CPA has gradually withered mainly because of leadership failure.  Hence, Nepal’s peace process is now facing severe challenges at different levels in the society. Such challenges are mainly centred on two aspects: challenges in the structural and procedural aspects and challenges in the psychological aspect of the stakeholders. However, these two aspects are much related. Additionally, these are sometimes the cause or effect of one another (Upreti and Ghimire, 2012).

Peace process in Nepal is incomplete, fragmented, misinterpreted and blatantly used for the vested political interests (for example, inaction in establishing Truth and Reconciliation Commission, groupism of ex-combatants for the interests of particular political leaders, release of prisoners based on political affiliation, distribution of financial resources, transitional justice ignored, etc.). So many major issues of the peace process such as transitional justice, security sector restructuring, reconciliation, reconstruction and development are unaddressed.  

2.2 Unsettled issues from the past conflict

The transition period often becomes an important period to address the mishaps of conflict in a constructive manner. This is an important phase to initiate the process of ‘dealing with the past’. The term ‘dealing with the past’ refers to how societies address the legacies of past human rights abuses, mass atrocities, and other forms of social traumas and the effects of war/conflict in order to build more democratic, just, and peaceful future. Addressing impunity, giving justice, reconciliation, reintegration, and rehabilitation are important components of it.

Reconciliation is a process of searching for justice, healing, forgiveness, a pattern of cooperation and coexistence, as well as understanding the needs, fears, and aspirations of past antagonists. Justice and reconciliation are both fundamental elements for peace building. However, the languages they have are often found to be incompatible to each other when in practice (Hartzell 1999). Peace building is ascertained with these two major aspects. One hand holds the need to deal with those accused of past human rights abuses and wrongdoers and thus seeks justice for the victims; while the other hand holds the need for overcoming or transforming the enmities and building bridges among those victims and their perpetrators. As Hartzell (1999) observes this issue of amnesty or reconciliation is ‘one of the most troubling quandaries’ for peace-builders. In the context of Nepal, this is an unsettled issue. For example, there is a delicate situation, in reconciling people who were victims of the Maoists and the former Maoist cadres who committed such atrocities in the village level. Same concern remains with the state security forces and political decision makers. Reconciliation is possible only if justice is done to the victims and survivors at the local level (Upreti and Ghimire, 2012).

Similarly, repatriation of the people displaced by conflict, their reintegration with community, who forced them to be displaced are now occupying their houses and properties, will be very critical. It is important that these issues be tackled conscientiously. It is equally important to support conflict victims and survivors to claim their rights to compensation, restitution, and rehabilitation. Similarly, it is necessary to address the structural causes of conflict within a framework of dealing with the past. Building positive relations among people who were humiliated during the conflict is essential and the focus should be on building positive relations within a community. The state is taking a blanket approach to compensate every wrong doing with monetary compensation (e.g., paying one million to many people without any basis). Such monetary compensation cannot provide justice in all cases. This trend of adopting short term pragmatism would hamper long term peace and stability.

Secondly and more importantly, alleged perpetrators and human rights abusers are strong actors in the post-conflict phase and they are able to influence the decisions. The state has not been able to curb crime, violence, and intimidation. Human rights abuses, forceful closures, and damage to property are still an everyday reality in Nepal. Sad is the fact that the perpetrators are not often brought to justice. If the wrongdoers are not made accountable for their work, the transition becomes more complicated and peace and democracy are more than difficult to achieve. Such conditions boost up a culture of impunity in future, create hopelessness and helplessness among people and, thus, threaten a sustainable peace.

The contemporary discussions in Nepal are centred on legal justice. In addition to legal justice, however, there is a need for other kinds of transitional justice like rectifying justice, symbolic justice and social and economic justice. There is so far no official or public process to address the issues of such justice. However, some people need a certain period to internalise and undergo a structural change. Needless to say, they should also be accommodated fairly. Randomly dividing community into certain groups like, Pahadi, Madhesi, rich (“Samanti”), poor or showing anger and sentiments upon a certain group is itself a latent conflict. The transition period should be able to build an environment of fairness, understanding, and clarity among the radically opposing groups (Upreti and Ghimire, 2012).

2.3 Dealing with post-conflict transition:

It requires appropriate management process that deals with past and envisions better future by generating hope and aspiration (Tutu, 1999; UNESCO, 2003; Aditya et al., 2006). It can be achieve by collective ownership of the CPA and its implementation, appropriately dealing with past and ensuring transitional justice and rule of law, guarantying transitional security, providing peace dividends to conflict affected people, proper  restructuring of security sector and undertaking reconstruction and rehabilitation (Upreti, 2010). Making this post-conflict transition successful and achieving stability and peace after a long period of armed conflict is a very sensitive and demanding task. Several other emerging smaller conflicts and the lack of consensus on mode of federalism make this task complicated. This process requires a firm commitment among the key actors on the good values and beliefs of the past, restoration of sustainable peace and harmony, a culture of collective responsibility and concerted action and ability to develop appropriate approaches and procedures. Such transformation requires changes in the attitudes, behaviours, perspectives, thinking, and actions of all the key actors. Obviously, as for Nepal, the political leadership, bureaucracy, judiciary, security forces, and social elites are such influential figures (Upreti and Ghimire, 2012).

2.4 Failure in making a new constitution

The CA has failed again and again1 to accomplish the constitution making task. Many important, yet, potentially contentious issues, such as defining the state governing systems, federal structures (boundaries, names, levels, etc.), inclusive mechanisms and electoral systems, maintaining judicial autonomy are major hurdles to proceed. The Interim Constitution demands consensus, or at least a two-third majority, to decide on each article. If the current political mistrust among the major political parties continues, it will definitely affect the decision-making process. This has posed serious question on whether it will be able to bring a publicly-owned constitution even within the extended time. Thus, developing consensus on constitution-making is becoming a huge challenge.

2.5 Mistrust, suspicion, expectations, and frustrations

Mistrust of the general people towards the political leaders and even with the political system is one of the most worrying issues. It hinders smooth transition, if left unaddressed. With the change of each form of governing system, this mistrust has been escalating since the post-Rana period. Trust plays a vital role in politics. Politics basically operates on trust as people trust their elected representatives to represent their interests. One of the fundamental criteria used to measure trustworthiness is to match what one says with what one does. People trust those who do as they say. Hence, maintaining integrity in this respect is a must in developing their trust. However, politicians are prone to making hollow promises and often commit to things they cannot deliver. Such promises are blown especially around elections and burst to nothing consequently. The most prominent example is their failure to deliver a new constitution in the stipulated time. All three major political parties and the regional parties from the Terai-Madhes had committed in their election manifestos to bring the new constitution within two years. But they failed to fulfil their promise.

Growing mistrust is also a war weariness symptom in Nepal. People had many expectations from the newly established democracy after the Panchayat system. After the political change of 1990, politicians were not able to govern the country as per the aspirations of the people. As expected by the people, each changing regime was unable to improve living conditions, restore peace, control corruption, address exclusion and discrimination. After the then king started direct rule on 1 February 2005, the political leaders publicly acknowledged their mistakes and promised not to repeat them in future. In the 12-point understanding reached between the SPA and the CPN (M), point 7 states: “The seven political parties, undertaking self-evaluation, have expressed commitment not to repeat the mistakes of the past which were committed while in parliament and in government”. But, no change and again mistrust and suspicion in politics and society are mounting. The situation requires the politicians to start the process of restoring dignity and rebuild the trust of the people. However, there is another face of the coin which is also equally critical. There is a growing tendency in people on demanding and expecting everything to be fulfilled by the state within the transition period. Such actions have been creating enormous difficulty to manage the transition.

3     Issues in managing political transition

In this section neither I am engaged in theoretical or academic discussion nor presenting the content in the format of standard peer reviewed journal papers. Instead, I have opted for a very pragmatic, simple and easy to read style presentation. I did it deliberately hoping that it will be useful for wide range of readers. In the following sections I am discussing these issues in the framework of management of post-conflict transition in Nepal. 

Making post conflict transition successful requires focusing on the ‘right process’, ‘dealing with contents’, and ‘managing behaviours’, which is discussed in the following sub-sections.

3.1 Management of process

So far, process part of Nepal’s post conflict transition management is not only week but also misleading and therefore it can be said that it is ‘without processes’. Nepal’s post conflict transformation process can be even more successful by making ‘process right’. To make process right means inclusion of main stakeholders in the decision-making process (e.g., women, Dalists, marginalised, small parties, conflict victims, etc), balancing confidentiality and transparency, getting approval of decisions that have far reaching consequences by people (e.g., referendum), proper documentation of the decisions, being accountable to sincerely  implement decision. Experiences of other conflict ridden countries show that right process helps to make quality decisions and that helps better implementations of the decisions (ICG, 2006).

Proper process helps to achieve these transformations and lack of due process creates obstacles and complications while implementing transformation packages.

Table 1: Indicators of the successful post-conflict transition management

·        Inclusive constitution making process ·        Major constitutional issues decided by referendum (ownership principle). ·        Constitutional principles respected while making constitution, ·        Completion of constitution making within the defined time

·        Independent Peace Commission and all other monitoring mechanisms in full function ·        High degree of peoples participation in transition process

·        All agreements and understandings are implemented honestly and timely

·        Ensure transitional justice ·        Impunity is properly addressed ·        Rule of law is established ·        Implementation reparation, reconciliation, rehabilitation, reintegration, reconstruction packages,

·        Police performance is effective and free from politicisation and malpractices  ·        Security situation is ensured  ·        Illegal arms supply controlled ·        Armed groups, if any, controlled

·        Smooth implementation of DDR and SSR according standard practices ·        Key stakeholders committed for SSR ·        New national security policy formulated ·        Collective commitment from all political parties in addressing transitional challenges

·        Human rights situation is improved ·        Impunity is full addressed ·        Full justice to conflict victims and survivors ·        Rule of law respected

·        Constructive dialogue, mutual respect and collective responses  among political parties (coalition culture) ·        Decide the irreconcilable difference through democratic procedure (e.g., voting)

·        Collective commitment and ensure all requirement for election to provide elected functional  leadership in local and national government ·        Develop public ownership of transition management by involving people ·        Consensus in development priority and economic development

·        Cautious and well assessed response to popular and extremist demand ·        Engage in dialogue and interaction (respond but not react) ·        Coalition culture and proper power sharing arrangement    ·        Non-interference in the function of security forces, bureaucracy, judiciary  ·        Positive indication or the high economic growth rate ·        Major infrastructure development started ·        Rights of citizens respected

·        LPC independently engage on dealing with the past  ·        Reintegration and psychological reconstruction incorporated into national policy and practices

Source: Compiled from Upreti 2008; Upreti 2006 and 2004.

3.1.1     Managing the content

Successful management of post conflict transition requires a process of smooth transformation of the transition (Pyakuryal et al., 2008f). It is possible only when the political, economic, social, cultural, psychological barriers are dismantled and new vision and commitments are made through appropriate process (Bloomfield et al., 2003; Galtung, 1996; Upreti, 2004). It is virtually impossible to manage complicated transition without transforming perspective, thinking, action and behaviour of political decision makers of Nepal. Transformation requires in:

a)      Attitude, behaviour, perspective, thinking and action of major actors (political leadership, bureaucracy, judiciary, security forces, social elites and their organizational structures, procedure and mode of representation);

b)     Rules of procedures and minimum political ethics,

c)      Issue/contents (addressing the war-time issues and CPA contents,

d)     Structures (transformation is required in existing structure and power relations),

e)      Context (transformation of exclusionary and controlling patterns of governance),

f)      Value (e.g., social change through violent action to social change through peaceful action, non-violence, and co-existence). 

The post-conflict transition management must

a)      address root causes of the conflict and structural inequalities;

b)     build trust, cohesion and harmony at community;

c)      develop community resilience to cope with the adverse impacts of conflict;

d)     create space and opportunities for peace building,

e)      ensure visible benefit to socially excluded and marginalized people and make sure that they are included in the decision making process;

f)      prevent possible widening of gap between rich and poor and enforces discriminations;

g)     make sure that development interventions are not introducing new conflicts and tensions and

ensure that resources are not captured and manipulated by elites. This is possible through incorporating PCIA into development programmes and projects.

3.1.2     Managing the behaviour

Behavioural response in post conflict situation 

 

Nepal’s current transition is becoming extremely complicate to manage mainly because of the erratic behaviour of the political decision makers. Post conflict transition became shaky because of the insensitive behaviour of some of the political and social leaders who hoped to benefit by manipulating the ethnic sentiments. It will be extremely difficult to successfully mange transition if the current approach of political leaders continues. So far, leadership failed to internalise the complexity of managing post-conflict transformation (Upreti, 2008c). Making transition successful requires accomplishing the following:

• Agreeing on the constitutional principles for the new constitution
• Implementation of the agreements and understanding
• Monitoring of the implementation
• Adaptation and revisions of the agreements
• Stakeholders participation in implementing the CPA provisions  
• Collective commitment for the new election for making new constitution
• Agreeing and conducting local election that provide political space for democracy to function   

3.1.3     Federalisation of country

3.1.4     Constructive engagement of the international community

3.1.5     India, china and geopolitics

3.1.6     Addressing voices of marginalised, excluded and poor

3.1.7     Restoring law and order

Exercising rule of law is a major concern. Organized crimes and insecurity are mounting, extortion, abduction, robbery, looting, narcotics smuggling, rape, girls trafficking, hunting and smuggling of rare animals (e.g., musk deer, valuable furry skin, tiger bones, rare herbs, woods, etc.) are still continuing or in some cases they are even growing. So far political parties have not proactively engaged enough to deal with transitional security concern. Further, if parties continue their coercive youth mobilisation it will be the worst situation. Hence, addressing transitional security and restoring law and order requires change in the current style of dealing of political parties and need to promote collective efforts from government, political parties, security actors, civil society, media and community.

3.1.8     Terai issue

3.2 Management of expectation

3.3 Management of time

3.4 Management of externalities

4      Neutrality and non-interference

One of the existing challenges in Nepal is politicisation and political interference in the governing system. The implementation of peace agreements requires neutrality and non-politicisation. So, based on past experiences, a strong mechanism needs to be devised. This mechanism should bring bureaucratic, political, judicial, and security reforms. It plays significant role to maintain neutrality and minimise political interference in governance and development. Indubitably, it will be feasible only after the new constitution is in place. Therefore, a transitional arrangement to ensure neutrality and non-interference, such as a governing oversight mechanism, is essential until the implementation of a new constitution (Upreti and Ghimire, 2012).

4.1 Management of extremes

4.2 Some of possible structures required for successful management of post-conflict transition

The present centralised state structures (like ministries and departments) are not suitable to address the challenges of the post-conflict transition (e.g., MoPR) and therefore either their scope have to be shifted to the new structures or they have to change the existing mode of operation.

• Independent Land Reform Commission
• National Security Council or Security Commission for Security Sector Restructuring,
• Commission for the Investigation of Disappeared Persons
• Local Peace Committee
• National Peace Commission
• State Restructuring (Recommendation) Commission
• Accountability Commission 
• Research and Resource Centre,
• Post-Conflict reconstruction Commission
• Technical Committees and Special Task Forces (for thematic issues)

4.3   

4.4  Bb

4.5  Cc

4.6  dd

5     Opportunities in managing political transition

6     Challenges of managing political transition

6.1 Conceptual, ideological Challenges

6.2 Operational Challenges

1. Agreeing on federal structures
2. Coping with unanticipated challenges emerging in the course of transition. 
3. Agreeing on creation of structures as required by the peace agreements,
4. Promoting economic growth and stability
5. Ensuring peace dividends to conflict victims and poor sections of society,
6. Ensuring transitional Justice and rule of law,
7. Ensuring transitional security[5],
8. Facilitating disarming, demobilizing and demilitarisation (society is heavily militarised),
9. Conduction of free and fair elections,
10. Implementation of reconciliation, rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction,
11. Implementation of the understandings and agreements reached in the past,
12. Keeping external interference away or minimum an obtaining international support,
13. Maintaining impartiality and keeping security, bureaucracy and judiciary out of political interference
14. Managing and or addressing public expectation and frustration,
15. Monitoring of peace process and peace agreements,
16. Peace dividends to conflict affected people and reparation packages.
17. Realising the need of political party building[6]
18. Initiating appropriate reconstruction and development[7]
19. Security system restructuring 

The widening gap of mistrust between the major political parties has caused serious hurdles in managing transition and moving this country ahead. Political scientists often argue that there is no enemy in the politics but there is opponent. However, the major political parties in Nepal are treating their opponents as invisible enemies (especially in settling the differences). They are blatantly abusing very sensitive issues like ethnic radicalism for their vested political interests rather than handling sensitive issues delicately. However, degree and intensity of abuses vary between parties. 

6.2.1     Challenges to Party Organization and Conduct

6.2.2     Lack of transitional security

Global experiences show that transitional security is one of the prime concerns in countries that have experienced civil war and violent armed conflict. Nepal is no exception. Achieving stability, peace, and democracy requires vision, commitments, and right institutional arrangements on security in this transitional period. Based on extensive research on the issues of managing post-conflict transitions and achieving peace, the authors argue that, first and foremost, important factor is to respect ‘rule of law’. It ensures respecting human rights, exercising democratic practices, and effective implementation of development agendas. However, in Nepal, transitional security is deteriorating day-by-day. The radicalisation of society and the use of violence (e.g., forceful closures and bandhs, strikes, damaging public and private properties, and so forth) to fulfil their demands are becoming regular phenomena. For example, only in a single month (in August 2007), 19 different groups[8] had called 55 bandhs and blockades in Nepal. General strikes, closures (which are sometimes even indefinite) and blockades are routinely observed across the country. Often, small disputes take a violent turn like blazing vehicles, smashing or destroying public and private properties, humiliating travellers. Violent clashes between

the wings of various political parties are frequent. They further create insecurity and development challenges. Similarly, most of the major political parties have used youth forces in coercion in the name of providing security. The Young Communist League[9] (YCL), Youth Force (YF), and Madhes Rakshya Bahini (MRB) are very few examples of the militarised youth organisations. Such coercive mobilisation of the youths by political parties has also infested the state with insecurity and violence thereby obstructing development. Mostly, the political actors have created these petty interested groups. Quite ironically and irritatingly, their actions have been wrongly justified as necessary to provide security to people in case the state fails to do so. But at the heart of this militarisation are vested interests of several groups who are represented in the state. They are using development as means of resource capture where local parties’ cadres divide the local financial resources for their personal and/or partisan benefits. This creates parallel structures and violates rules of law. Here, the state as an elite actor ought to be empowered as a legislative authority to deal with the situations. Only the legally defined institution of the state has the mandate to use coercive force. Other organisations operating parallel without any legal mandate consequently weaken the state security apparatus and ultimately create chaos.

The criminalisation of politics and politicisation of crime is becoming a common character in Nepal. Criminals are politically protected and used for the political parties' benefit. Transitional security always suffers from such political protection to criminals. The mobilisation of criminals for political purpose and at the same time political interests in protecting them for a specific political party’s purpose have jeopardised transitional security. Similarly, the practice of silencing weak victims by threatening makes the system weak. Most often, taking undue advantages from transitional tension are the interests of powerful groups in Nepal. Direct or indirect engagement of powerful elites in extra-legal activities worsens security problems. Further, impunity is a serious problem in transition. For example, no further action against those held guilty by the Mallik Commission and Rayamajhi Commission is a glaring example of how Nepal deal with the impunity.

6.3 Proliferation of SALW and criminalisation of society

The proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) is another challenge. Undoubtedly, the illicit trade and use of SALW not only intensifies civil wars and armed conflicts, but also creates insecurity and severely hinders post-peace agreement, reconciliation, and reconstruction efforts. In Nepal, it is extremely difficult to find out the actual number and types of SALW illegally produced, traded, and used in different parts of the country. However, the proliferation of SALW in Nepal is one of the major security challenges (Upreti and Nepali 2006). In Nepal, the proliferation of SALW owes not just to the 10 years of armed conflict and consequent implications, but also to rampant poverty, chronic unemployment and the open border with India. So, the state should urgently respond to the small arms flow seriously. The government needs to play a lead role to combat the illegal proliferation of small arms. This campaign succeeds only if the political parties, civil society, experts, the international community, and citizens as a whole support it actively. Organised crime and insecurity related to extortion, abduction, robbery, looting, narcotics smuggling, human trafficking, bootlegging, and the hunting and smuggling of rare animals (e.g., musk deer, tiger bones, etc.) are increasing. Furthermore, coercive youth mobilisation is complicating the security challenges. Addressing these phenomena is the collective responsibility of the government, political parties, security actors, civil society, academicians, the media, and the community.

6.4. External interference in the framing of the constitution and management of transition

The influences of powerful countries are stronger in the countries suffering from conflict, instability, and in those who are dependent on external support and resources. Like Afghanistan, South Sudan and many other conflict affected countries, Nepal is another example of how external interests are prevailing in political, social, and economic spheres. It is working in the prickly cushion offered in the name of support to various activities like federalisation, constitution-making, peace process, integration, and rehabilitation of excombatants, human rights, social justices, minority rights, security sector reform, economic reform, bureaucratic reform and legal reform. Moreover, it is also receiving donations in the name of institutional development, economic reform and development policy formulation. The support is penetrating into core national interests such as national security policy, strengthening security institutions etc. No political decision-makers and bureaucratic mechanisms have demonstrated their commitment to address these serious issues of these external interferences.

Several constitutions have been written and submitted to the then CA and the politicians by different interest-based organisations from the donor-funded money. Large portion of time of the Constituent Assembly (CA) members were consumed by the foreign tours an trainings, attending meetings and workshops in Nepal and aboard, writing papers, and inaugurating events of the NGOs funded by donors. Most of the (if not all) activities were stealing precious time of the CA members to to constructively engage in settling core contentious issues before finalising the constitution. Even it has been observed that the CA members had attended the numerous but repetitive workshops and meetings organised by NGOs and funded by donors leaving the important meetings of the CA. It is very hard to comprehend how constitution-making is supported by such activities of CA members and NGOs. Such activities were nearly paralysing the transition and constitution-making process in Nepal.

6.5  Institutionalisation of changes through new constitution

Nepal has to institutionalise the changes achieved from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by promulgating the new constitution. However, the constitution making is not much in priority in the activities of political leaders. For example, most of the political leaders are found not respecting CA meetings.

1. Critique of management of transition

Elizabeth Shove and Gordon Walker from Department of Sociology and Department of Geography, Lancaster University are critical in the management of transition. They write:, “We are wary of the notion that transition management, with its accompanying repertoire of concepts and tools, provides a neat model of how managers might intervene (albeit reflexively) to shape and modulate processes of change. We have observed that these approaches can all too easily obscure their own politics, smoothing over conflict and inequality; working with tacit assumptions of consensus and expecting far more than participatory processes can ever hope to deliver” (Page 7).

2. Conclusion

Making Nepal’s post-conflict transition successful requires change in current mindset of political decision makes and collective efforts of political parties, civil society, bureaucracy, security organizations and international community. It is crucially important to review the past achievements and problems faced in the past 6 years (since signing of the CPA) in terms of on process, mechanisms, and outcomes, spirit of various agreements (avoiding blames and counter blames) and come forward with new commitments, necessary institutional arrangement and appropriate process and procedure that ensure smooth transition from war to peace and address genuine grievances of Nepalese people.

Coming years are not only opportunities for Nepal’s peace, democracy and prosperity but also challenging in achieving them. If the current crisis is not collectively taken by all political parties as their common concern, we will not be able to manage transition.

Nepal needs long term security policy of the nation. Long term security policy of the nation has to consider at least coming 5 decades of the possible security scenarios in the region and international level. Restructuring of security apparatus (army, police, intelligence), ministries (home and defence), National Security Council should be guided by national security doctrine and policy, international relations and economic policies with strong provision of civilian control of the security sector and proper oversight from the parliament (Upreti and Nepali, 2006).

References

1. Aditya, A., Upreti, B. R. and Adhikari, P. K. (2006), Countries in Conflict and Processing of Peace: Lessons for Nepal. Kathmandu: Friends for Peace. 2006.
2. Baechler, G., Acharya, N., Dammann, P., Rajbhandari, R. And Upreti, B. R. (2008), Nepal Building New Road to Peace. Kathmandu: SDC
3. Bauman, Z. (1991) Modernity and Ambivalence, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
4. Bloomfield, D. Barnes, T. and Huyse, L. (2003), Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook. Stockholm: International IDEA.
5. Elzen, B. and Wieczorek, A. (2005) ‘Transitions towards sustainability through system innovation’ Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 72: 651-661.
6. Galtung, J. (1996), Peace by Peaceful Means. London: Sage Publications.
7. Hartzell CA. 1999. Explaining the stability of negotiated settlements to intrastate wars. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 43:1: 3-22.
8. ICG (2006), Beyond Victimhood: Women’s Peace Building in Sudan, Congo, Brussels and Uganda. Africa Report No 112 (28 June 2006). Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group.
9. Kemp, R. and Loorbach, D. (2006) ‘Transition Management: a reflexive governance approach’, in, Voss, J-P., Bauknecht, D. and Kemp, R. (eds). Reflexive Governance for Sustainable Development, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
10. Pyakuryal K.N., Upreti, B.R. and Sharma, S.R. (2008) (Eds). Nepal: Transition to Transformation. Kathmandu: HNRSC, NCCR North-South.
11. Rip, A. (2006) ‘A co-evolutionary approach to reflexive governance – and its ironies’, in, Voss, J-P., Bauknecht, D. and Kemp, R. (eds). Reflexive Governance for Sustainable Development, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
12. Rotmans, J., Kemp, R. and van Asselt, M. (2001) ‘More Evolution than Revolution. Transition Management in Public Policy’, Foresight 3(1): 15-31
13. Shove, E. and Walker, G. (n.d.) Caution! Transitions ahead: politics, practice and sustainable transition management. Lancaster: Department of Sociology and Department of Geography, Lancaster University.
14. Smith A., Stirling, A. and Berkhout, FT. (2005) ‘The governance of sustainable socio-technical transitions’, Research Policy, 34: 1491-1510.
15. Swyngedouw, E. (2006) ‘Impossible/Undesirable Sustainability and the Post-Political Condition’, paper presented at the Royal Geographical Society with the Institute of British Geographers Conference, London, September 2006.
16. Tutu, D. (1999), No Future without Forgiveness. London: Rider.

17.  UNESCO (2003). Women and Peace in Africa: Case Studies on traditional conflict resolutions practices. Paris: UNESCO Workshops.

18. Upreti, B. R. (2004). The Price of Neglect: From Resource Conflict to the Maoist Insurgency in the Himalayan Kingdom. Kathmandu: Bhrikuti Academic Publishers.
19. Upreti, B. R. (2006), Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal: The Maoist Insurgency, Past Negotiations and Opportunities for Conflict Transformation. Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 
20. Upreti, B. R. (2008), Framework for management of post-conflict transition in Nepal: Some issues and concerns. A paper presented at the national seminar on Democracy and Post-conflict Management in Nepal organized by Nepal Foundation for Advance Studies (NEFAS) in cooperation with Frederick Ebert Stiftung (FES) at Hotel Everest, Kathmandu on 28 December 2008.
21. Upreti, B.R. 2009 (Nepal), Nepal From War to Peace: Legacies of the Past and Hopes for the Future. New Delhi: Adroit Publishers.
22. Upreti, B. R. (2010), Political Change and Challenges of Nepal: Reflection on Armed Conflict, Peace Process and State Building. Volume I and II. Saarbrucken: Lambert Academic Publishing.
23. Upreti BR, Ghimire A. (2012), Conflict, Transition, and Challenges to Nepal’s Peace Process, An SAs RCO Discussion Paper. Kathmandu: NCCR North-South, South Asia Coordination Office.
24. Upreti, B. R.and R. K. Nepali (2006) (eds.) Nepal at Barrel of Gun: Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and their Impacts. Kathmandu: South Asia Small Arms Network-Nepal.
25. Upreti BR, Sharma SR, Pyakuryal KN and Ghimire, S. (2010), The Remake of a state: Post-Conflict Challenges and State building in Nepal. Kathmandu: HNRSC and the RCO, (NCCR) North-South.
26. Voss, J. P. and Kemp, R. (2005) “Reflexive governance for sustainable development – incorporating feedback in social problem solving” ESEE conference, Lisbon 14-17 June 2005.

About the author:

Bishnu Raj Upreti holds a PhD in conflict management (2001) from Wageningen University, the Netherlands. He is actively engaged in conflict transformation and peace related research and teaching. During 22 years of professional career he has engaged in teaching and research at University of London and University of Surrey in the UK and Kathmandu University. He worked in different international organizations in the capacity of professional staff, resource person and consultant. He worked four years (1990-1994) as Assistant Agricultural Economist in government service once selected from the Public Service Commission. He has thirty books (written and co-edited) to his credit on conflict related subjects and about 100 articles and chapters published in different national and international journals, magazines and edited books. He is widely quoted in national and international media about the Nepal’s armed conflict. He has been visiting fellow in Uppsala University, member of the Advisory Board of Centre for Unconventional Security Affairs and Executive Board Member of Asia-Pacific Peace research Association. Currently, he is Regional Coordinator, South Asia Coordination Office of Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR)-North-South, based in Kathmandu. His geographical research engagement is largely South Asia, Africa and Western Europe.

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[1] Since then, the CPN (M) and the Unity Centre united in January 2009,  the name CPN (M) was changed into the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or UCPN (M). Small breakaway faction of the CPN (M) led by Matrika Yadav kept its original name CPN (M) even after the formation of the UCPN (M). Again UCPN (M) Vice Chairman Mohan Baidhya, General Secretry Ram Bahadur Thapa and other many senior leaders of the UCPN (M) separated and formed the new party named as Communist party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M).

[2] The 5622^nd Meeting of Security Council had established United Nations Political Mission in Nepal  (UNMIN) by unanimously adopting the resolution 1740 (23 January 2007) as per the request of the Government of Nepal and the CPN (M). 

[3] All total 19604 people have been qualified from the UNMIN verification process. 

[4] For details about the Joint Monitoring Committee, see the decision (SC/8942) of 5622^nd Meeting (PM) of the Security Council of UN.

[5] In any war-torn countries one of the major challenges after signing the peace agreements is maintaining security situation. Though the term, ‘post conflict’ is contested in Nepal particularly after the emergence of several small armed groups and their engagement in violence, the operational definition of post conflict is ‘a situation after the formal signing of the CPA on 21 November 2006 by the government and the CPN (M) that ends armed conflict and parties earlier engaged in fights, violence and war start to implement the provisions of the agreements’. The transitional security of Nepal particularly in Terai[5] is severely challenged by small armed groups such as Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (Jwala Singh); Janatantrik Madesh Mukti Morcha (Goit), Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (Bisphot Singh), Madeshi Mukti Tiger, Terai Cobra; Python, Terai Baggi, Terai Army, Madeshi Virus Killers Party, Royal Defence Army, Gorkha Line Mukti Morcha, Liberation Tigers of Terai Ilem (LTTE), Kirat Workers Party (mainly Udayapur and Khotang). In addition to these armed groups, there are other criminal groups active in Terai (Chhotelal Sahani; Sanju Baba, Raju Singh Rathor and Munna Singh Groups are few of many others mainly operating from India), rural areas and towns and creating severe insecurity and violence. This is serious immediate security concern that state has to address (Upreti, 2008e). Nepalese people are seriously suffering from insecurity and violence. Phenomena of criminality led insecurity such as kidnapping of children, murder and attempted murder, rubbery, illegal trafficking of arms and ammunitions, human trafficking, drugs abuses and trafficking, atrocities, murders, killings, massacres, forced displacement became serious (Upreti and Nepali, 2006). This phenomenon, particularly from Terai is growing particularly after signing of the CPA. The transitional situation is getting further complicated after creation of the coercive nature of organisations such as Young Communist League[5] (YCL), Youth Force (YF) and Madesh Rakshya Bahini by political parties. The official justification of need for creation of such forces by political parties does not match with the actions. The only legally defined institutions such as police, army and private security system approved by the government have coercive rights. However, these organisations are operating without any legal mandate that consequently weakens state security apparatus, creates parallel functioning and adds insecurity. Any one can easily understand that coercive forces created by political parties serve their vested interests. Once powerful political parties have created such coercive forces severely weakened police force (by politicisation or political protection) can not contain them. Hence, Nepal’s security situation is facing dilemma.

[6] Political parties are the leading force in nation building and democracy and their governing style determines destiny of this country. Support to democratise political parties, promoting internal democracy and development of younger leadership are crucially important to make transformation successful. The practices of exclusion and under recognition in political process are the outcome of feudal mindset and changing such attitude requires intimate engagement and dialogue-cum-practice.

[7] Reconstruction and development is one of the most important elements in achieving peace and stability. New vision, new policy, new strategy, new institutional arrangement, new methodological approaches and fresh perspective on development are essential to make development sector responsive and contributing to make peace process successful. Adopting conflict sensitive development approaches is one of the main options for policy makers to maximise the contribution of development sector in achieving sustainable peace, social harmony and living standard of Nepalese people. The newly created Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction has central role in developing conflict sensitive development vision, policies and strategies for the promotion of reconstruction and development.

[8] The groups calling bandhs and blockade were businesspeople, CPN (M) affiliated organisations, JTMM (JS), Limbuwan-related parties, Chure-Bhabar Ekata Samaj, Madhesi People's Right Forum, Madhesi Revolutionary Front, Madhesi Tiger, conflict victims, local communities, different wings of major seven parties, independent student groups, transport unions, dalit and janajati organisations, Tamang Autonomous Region Democratic Front, United Tharu National Liberation Front and other groups (see OCHA report of August 2007 for detail).

[9] When the UCPN (M) leader, Pushpa Kamal Dahal ’Prachanda’, was selected as the first elected Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal (second communist prime minister after the late Manamohan Adhikari), the UCPN (M) declared that they would demilitarise the YCL. This provision came as a result of the Seven-Point Agreement reached between three major parties on the formation of a coalition government. However, it has not happen.